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The Priority Secured Party /Subordinate 
Lien Creditor Conflict: 
Is ''Lien-Two'' Out in the Cold? 
DAVID FRISCH* 
INTRODUCTION 
WHEN the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code1 first began, one issue which had to be addressed was what to do 
about secured credit.2 Though the justification for secured credit 
has never been clear, 3 and its fairness has been doubted;' the 
drafters of Article 9 provided a simplified structure within which 
it could be used "with less cost and with greater certainty."15 This 
has apparently resulted in more credit for small businesses being 
secured rather than unsecured.6 However, even if secured credit 
• Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D., 1975, University of Miami; 
L.L.M., 1980, Yale University. 
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1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations in this Article are to the 
official text and comments of the Uniform Commercial Code (1978) [hereinafter referred 
to as the Code or the U.C.C.]. 
2. See Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter: Homer Kripke, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 577, 578 (1982). 
3. One suggested justification is that security interests have aggregate efficiencies 
which result in savings to the debtor in the form of lower aggregate credit costs. This 
would occur, however, only ifthe creditor to whom the security interest is given is also the 
creditor least able to police against debtor misbehavior. See Jackson & Kronman, Secured 
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1158-61 (1979). Unfortunately, 
the ability to monitor the debtor is not determinative as to whom a security interest is 
given. It is suggested that more realistic factors are the economic power of the parties and 
the financing norms of the particular industry. 
4. For discussions regarding the fairness of permitting secured credit, see Gilmore, 
The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant 
Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A 
Review of Current Theories, 10 j. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). 
5. U.C.C. § 9-101, official comment. The principle sections of Article 9 which facili-
tate the use of secured credit are: § 9-204-"After-Acquired Property; Future Advances"; 
§ 9-205-"Use or Disposition of Collateral Without Accounting Permissible"; and § 9-
306-" 'Proceeds'; Secured Party's Rights on Disposition of Collateral." 
6. Soia Mentschikoff, in a brief written on behalf of the Permanent Editorial Board 
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does predominate within certain sectors of the economy, a debtor, 
whether a consumer or a business, will always have creditors who 
are unsecured. 7 
The coexistence of secured and unsecured creditors leads in-
evitably to conflicts between the two. How these conflicts are re-
solved depends to a great extent on the context in which they 
arise. It is not the purpose of this Article to examine the ways in 
which these conflicting interests are handled in insolvency pro-
ceedings, whether common law or statutory. Instead, its focus will 
be on the clash which occurs when an unsecured creditor armed 
with a judgment attempts to satisfy that judgment by resort to 
property of the debtor which is already subject to a perfected se-
curity interest. 8 Assuming the priority of the security interest, 9 the 
for the U.C.C. and submitted in Adams v. Southern Calif. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974), concluded that secured credit predomi· 
nates over unsecured credit among small businesses. For an interesting comment on this 
brief, sec Kripkc, supra note 2, at 580. 
7. If the anticipated indebtedness is not great, the inconvenience and added expense 
of negotiating a security agreement militates against the use of secured credit. 
8. Though it is possible for an unsecured creditor to obtain an interest in property of 
the debtor prior to obtaining a judgment, this is no longer a simple matter, given constitu· 
tional limitations on pre-judgment remedies. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 895 U.S. 
337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971), and their progeny. If the unsecured 
creditor does, however, succeed in satisfying the constitutionally mandated requisites for 
obtaining such an interest, the suggestions offered in this Article would be equally applica· 
hie thereto. 
The method utilized by the unsecured creditor to satisfy his or her jugment will vary 
from state to state. See infra notes 90-91. Regardless of which particular post-judgment 
enforcement procedure is employed, a "lien" will attach at some point in time to desig· 
nated property belonging to the debtor. For excellent discussions of when this lien arises, 
see Distler & Schubin, Enforcement Priorities and Liens: The New Yorli judgment Creditor's 
Rights in Personal Property, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 458 (1960); Ward, Ordering the judicial Process 
Lien and the Security Interest Under Article Nine: Meshing Two Different Worlds; Part 1-Secured 
Parties and Post-Judgment Process Creditors, 31 ME. L. REv. 223 (1980). Such liens are com· 
manly referred to as judicial liens. These liens should not be confused with consensual liens 
(i.e., security interests) nor those arising by operation of law in favor of one who furnishes 
services or materials with respect to goods (e.g., an artisan's lien). In so-called "order of 
delivery" jurisdictions, the creditor obtains such a lien upon delivery of the writ of execu· 
tion to the sheriff. In an "order of levy" jurisdiction, the lien does not arise until the 
sheriff actually levies on the property. Id. at 234-47. Once a creditor has obtained a judicial 
lien, he or she becomes, in the language of Article 9 of the Code, a lien creditor. U.C.C. § 
9-301(3). 
9. Unless a section of the U.C.C. provides otherwise, a security interest is effective 
against all third parties. U.C.C. § 9-201. Subsection 9-301(1)(b) provides for an exception 
to this rule in certain circumstances involving lien creditors. Though § 9-301 speaks in 
terms of subordination, it is in effect a priority statement: A lien creditor will have priority 
if he or she became a lien creditor before the security interest was perfected. The 1962 
1984] CREDITOR PRIORITY 151 
issue is whether the lien creditor should be permitted to somehow 
"get at" any equity the debtor may have in the collateral and, if 
so, how the interest of the secured party is to be protected. On 
this point, Article 9 is relatively silent.10 Despite the importance of 
each of these two competing interests, no theoretical construct of 
general applicability to resolve conflicts has yet been developed.11 
This Article will attempt to supply that construct. Before doing 
so, however, an overview of the judicial response to the lien credi-
tor/ secured party conflict is provided to illuminate some of the 
issues which any coherent theory must resolve. 
I. THE JUDICIAL REsPONSE 
Since the clash between these two interests can occur at vari-
ous points along the judgment-to-satisfaction continuum and can 
involve parties other than the secured party and the lien creditor, 
the list of potential issues is not small. Though a substantial num-
ber have been presented to courts for resolution, the list certainly 
has not been exhausted. When this clash will occur depends pri-
marily upon the time at which the secured party chooses to assert 
whatever rights he or she has as the priority lien holder. This as-
sertion can occur either before or after the execution sale, can 
version of§ 9-301 required in addition that to have priority the lien creditor must not 
have had knowledge of the existing security interest. In 1972, the section was amended to 
eliminate the no-knowledge requirement; the revisers felt that this requirement was incon-
sistent with the spirit of the rule of priority, under which knowledge plays a very minor 
role. U.C.C. § 9-301, official comment. 
In addition to the foregoing, a secured party's interest, even if unperfected, will have 
priority over that of a lien creditor if the secured party perfects with respect to a purchase 
money security interest before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of 
the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-301(2). If unperfected because of an improper or insufficient 
filing, the secured party's interest, though unperfected, will prevail over a lien creditor 
who has knowledge of the contents of the filed financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-401. 
For a more extensive analysis of priorities, see Ward, supra note 8. 
10. While Article 9 of the Code deals extensively with particular issues of priority, it is 
nonetheless surprisingly quiet on the overall effects of its ordering of interests. This fact 
has been recognized by other commentators in different contexts. See, e.g., Nickles, Enforc-
ing Article 9 Security Interest Against Subordinate Buyers of Collateral, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
511 (1982). 
11. Though this conflict has not altogether escaped the attention of commentators, 
their attention has usually been focused on specific state codes. See, e.g., Henderson, The 
judicial Creditor Versus The Article Nine Secured Party, 17 IDAHO L. REv. 193 (1981); Note, 
Chattel Mortgages and Judgment Satisfaction-The Security Agreement as an Exemption from Exe-
cution in Missouri, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 515, 519 (1962). 
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involve the lien creditor and/ or the purchaser at the execution 
sale, and can take the form of an action for either possession of 
the collateral or damages for its conversion.12 The problem, 
therefore, is not one involving a single situational setting, but is 
one which is made up of a number of elements, and the resolution 
of each directly affects the interests of lien creditors.18 Following 
is an overview of how courts have resolved various aspects of the 
problem. 
A. The Right of the Secured Party to Vacate the Levy and Recover 
Possession of the Collateral 
A secured party which discovers a levy prior to the sheriff's 
disposition of the collateral14 may wish to vacate the levy and ob-
tain possession of the collateral. Some courts have allowed repos-
session, 15 while others have not. 16 
The most often cited case permitting repossession is William 
12. An analogous set of litigation possibilities exists when the debtor voluntarily trans-
fers possession of, or an interest in, the collateral without the consent of the secured party. 
See generally Nickles, supra note IO (discussing the issues which arise when there is a volun· 
tary sale by the debtor of the collateral); and Nickles, Rights and Remedies Between U.C.C. 
Article 9 Secured Parties with Conflicting Security Interests in Goods, 68 low AL. REv. 217 (1983) 
(discussing the issues which arise when a subordinate secured party asserts an interest in 
the collateral). 
13. Even in a suit brought by a secured party against an execution sale purchaser, the 
interests of lien creditors are affected. Judgments favorable to secured parties will affect 
the marketability of collateral and hence its value to lien creditors. For example, if an 
execution sale purchaser is liable to the secured party for conversion and damages are 
measured by the value of the collateral, regardless of the amount of the outstanding se· 
cured debt, the market for the collateral will disappear. See infra notes 219-20 and accom-
panying text. 
14. While U.C.C. § 9-504(3) does mandate, in certain circumstances, that notice be 
given to one secured party by another secured party who proposes to dispose of the collat· 
eral, this section does not mandate notice of either the levy or the proposed sale when the 
disposing party is a lien creditor. See Citizens Bank v. Perrin & Sons, 253 Ark. 639, 488 
S.W.2d 14 (1972). Notice of the proposed sale may be mandated, however, by other, non· 
Code, legislation. See, infra note 75. 
15. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Shapiro, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1979); Ford Motor Co. v. City of New York, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1974); Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa. D. & C. 2d 637 (1967); William Iselin & Co. v. 
Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1168 (Sup. 
Ct. 1967). 
16. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Pathological & Diagnostic Laboratories, Inc., 11 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 386 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972); Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 
So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); First Nat'! Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 
Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967). 
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Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd. 17 There the court concluded 
that: 
[o]n default, it would appear that [the secured party] became entitled to im-
mediate possession of the collateral, both by virtue of the express provisions 
of the security agreement and of section 9-503 . . .. 
After the default, the Debtor lost its right of possession and sale and 
retained only a contingent right in the surplus, if any, after sale .... 
Nor can the levy void the [secured party's] statutory right to possession 
when there is a default . . . .18 
It is noteworthy that this court thought the timing of the debtor's 
default (i.e., before or after the levy) to be irrelevant.19 
In contrast to the straightforward reasoning of those courts 
allowing repossession from the sheriff, those which have denied 
the secured party's claim have done so for a variety of reasons. 
One Florida court held that U .C.C. section 9-203 "may create a 
prior lien in favor of the person named in the agreement as credi-
tor on the chattels involved but does not exempt them from a 
forced judicial sale. Said chattel may still be sold by an execution 
creditor subject to the lien provided in the security agreement."20 
The issue of possession received summary treatment in the 
one New York case which did not allow the levy to be vacated.21 
One salient fact which may have influenced that decision was that 
the secured parties happened to be the parents of the president of 
the debtor corporation, and they acknowledged their reluctance 
17. 52 Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1168 (Sup. Ct. 1967). 
18. Id. at 823-24, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1170-71. U.C.C. § 9-
503 provides, in part, that "[u]nless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the 
right to take possession of the collateral." The other courts which have permitted reposses-
sion have also premised that right principally on the basis of this provision. See Ford Motor 
Co. v. City of New York, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Harrison Music 
Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 637 (1967). 
19. See 52 Misc. 2d at 824, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1171. But see 
First Nat'l Bank, 34 Wis. 2d at 539, 149 N.W.2d at 550; Ward, supra note 8, at 230. 
20. Altec Lansing, 204 So. 2d at 741. 
21. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 386. The court stated that 
[a]ll that Article 9 filing guarantees to the secured creditor is certain rights and 
remedies against the debtor upon default (Article 9-501 et seq.) and priority in 
the distribution of the debtor's assets or the proceeds therefrom (Article 9-301 
et seq.). It does not bar a subsequent or unsecured creditor from enforcing his 
rights any more than a second mortgagee is precluded from foreclosing by the 
existence of a first mortgage. 
Id. at 387. 
154 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 
to exercise their rights upon debtor's default.22 
In First National Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County,23 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, relying on section 9-311 and a state execu-
tion statute, decided that the secured party could not prevent the 
execution sale from going forward. It noted that the Wisconsin 
legislature had responded to the suggestion of section 9-311 by 
repealing and re-enacting its execution statute to correspond with 
the new terminology of the Code.2' For some reason this court 
believed that the secured party's rights were dependent upon 
whether the debtor was in default at the time of levy.211 Since 
there was no indication that the debtor was in default when the 
sheriff seized the collateral,28 the court allowed the execution sale 
to go forward subject to the lien of the secured party. 27 
All of the foregoing cases involved a secured party attempting 
to obtain possession of its collateral. An interesting variation on 
this theme was presented in an Illinois case in which the secured 
party attempted to retain possession of securities held by him as 
pledgee. 28 The appellate court affirmed a lower court order re-
quiring the secured party to sell the securities. The proceeds were 
to be applied first to the secured party's costs and debt and then 
to the creditor's judgment. The court held that the trial court 
properly exercised its discretion under the supplementary pro-
22. Id. It has been suggested that "[i]f the levy had been vacated, the collateral would 
have been insulated from judicial process." Henderson, supra note 11, at 207. This simply 
is incorrect. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. 
23. 34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967). 
24. U.C.C. § 9-311 provides: "The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or 
involuntarily transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, 
garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agree-
ment prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default." 
For a detailed discussion of the purpose and effect of this section, see infra notes 76-107 
and accompanying text. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was obviously of the opinion that § 9-311 has no sub-
stantive effect, but merely suggests further legislative action. The legislative response in 
Wisconsin reads as follows: "Equities sold. When personal property is subject to a security 
interest, the right and interest of the debtor in such property may be sold on execution 
against him, subject to the rights, if any, of the secured party." WIS. STAT.§ 272.26 (1958). 
25. First Nat'l Bank, 34 Wis. 2d at 539, 149 N.W.2d at 550. 
26. Id. at 539 n.6, 149 N.W.2d at 550 n.6. 
27. Id. at 539, 149 N.W.2d at 551. 
28. North Bank v. F & H Resources, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 950, 369 N.E.2d 174 (1977). 
When a lien creditor is attempting to reach collateral in the possession of the secured 
party, issues arise which are non-existent when the debtor is in possession. See infra note 
104 and accompanying text. 
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ceedings section of the state Civil Practice Act and that supple-
mentary proceedings came within the meaning of section 9-311's 
"other judicial process" language.29 
B. The Right of the Secured Party to Repossess from the Execution 
Sale Purchaser 
It is possible that the execution sale will go forward and that 
the collateral will be purchased by a third party or perhaps the 
lien creditor. Sometimes the secured party will not discover the 
act of levy until after the sale or, knowing of the levy, will fail to 
take the appropriate action or will be unable to prevent the sale. 30 
Most courts agree that the secured party's interest continues in 
the collateral notwithstanding the sale. 31 Whether the secured 
party is entitled to possession, however, will depend upon whether 
there has been a default by the debtor. If the debtor defaults 
prior to the sale, the sheriff cannot convey the continued right of 
possession to the purchaser,32 because 
[t]o hold otherwise would allow a sheriff to acquire greater property rights 
against the [secured party] than the [debtor] had. Further, the purchaser at 
the sheriff's sale would acquire the [collateral] subject to the [secured 
29. North Bank, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 954, 369 N.E.2d at 177. Implicit in this statement is 
the notion that U.C.C. § 9-311 is not self-executing. It has been suggested that "[s]ince the 
secured party has the duty to hold a commercially reasonable sale, the result [in North 
Bank] seems sensible because it protects both interests." Henderson, supra note 11, at 208. 
Though the secured party has this duty under U.C.C. § 9-504(3), it does not necessarily 
follow that a lien creditor is a proper party to complain of a breach. This Article contends 
that the lien creditor should, in fact, be entitled to complain of such a breach. See infra 
notes 171-94 and accompanying text. 
30. Some courts simply do not permit a secured party to vacate a levy. See supra notes 
20-29 and accompanying text. 
31. See United States v. Newton Lake Estates, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 432 (M.D. Pa. 1979); 
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Pate, 362 So. 2d 1245 (Miss. 1978); Smith v. Guzman, 16 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 
199 S.E.2d 369 (1973); Stearns Mfg. Co. v. National Bank & Trust Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 189 (Pa. C.P. 1972); Powell v. Whirlpool Employees Fed. Credit Union, 42 Mich. 
App. 228, 201 N.W.2d 683 (1972); Platte Valley Bank v. Krace, 185 Neb. 168, 174 
N.W.2d 724 (1970); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d 451, 303 
N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969). But see Moorehead v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 194 
Colo. 398, 572 P.2d 1207 (1978); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 
300 A.2d 8 (Del. 1972). It is interesting to note that Oklahoma has modified § 9-311 to 
make explicit that the secured party's interest will survive the sale. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12A, § 9-311 (West 1963). 
32. Smith, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 852; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 
60 Misc. 2d 451, 303 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
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party's] immediate right to possession. In effect, the purchaser would get the 
[debtor's] right of redemption.13 
On the other hand, if the sale precedes the debtor's default, the 
purchaser has the superior right of possession, but only until an 
event of default has occurred. 84 
In at least one state, the right to possession upon debtor's de-
fault vis-a-vis an execution sale purchaser is not one of the privi-
leges of priority accorded to a secured party. In a much criticized 
opinion, 315 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the purchaser 
takes free of all prior liens and that the secured party retains only 
a priority position as to the proceeds. 36 The court reasoned that, 
since "[i]t is left to the law of each state to determine the form of 
'appropriate process,' " 37 and since "[t]here is no statutory provi-
sion in Delaware for the appropriate process to be followed by a 
creditor intending to limit the interest in secured property ac-
quired by a purchaser at a sale,''38 pre-Code law remains in effect 
with the result that the purchaser takes free of all encum-
brances. 39 The court further suggested that this approach is pref-
33. Smith, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 855 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Maloney, 46 Misc. 2d 251, 252, 259 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (Sup. Ct. 1965)). 
34. Smith, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 856; Platte Valley Bank, 185 Neb. at 172-73, 174 
N.W.2d at 727-28. The execution sale purchaser in Platte invoked the equitable doctrine of 
marshalling of assets in an unsuccessful attempt to evade the secured party's possessory 
rights. Though comment 3 to U.C.C. § 9-311 suggests the application of marshalling 
under appropriate circumstances, the Platte court stated that "the rule is well settled in 
equity that the doctrine of marshalling assets is not an absolute right, and cannot be in-
voked or applied so as to defeat statutory rights." 185 Neb. at 173, 174 N.W.2d at 729. See 
also infra note 117. For an interesting, but somewhat confusing, case, see Stearns Mfg. Co. 
v. National Bank & Trust Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 189 (Pa. 1972), in which the court, 
though acknowledging that the secured party's interest survived the execution sale, never-
theless permitted the execution sale purchaser to retain possession. 
35. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 208; Justice, Secured Parties and Judgment Credi-
tors-The Courts and Section 9-311 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 433 (1975). 
36. Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8 (Del. 1972). 
37. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 300 A.2d at 11 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-311, comment 2) (em-
phasis deleted). 
38. Id. 
39. The court reasoned: 
It appears • • • that it was the intent of the Legislature to forbear concerning 
the enactment of any statutory provision for the "appropriate process" contem-
plated by§ 9-311, in order that our case law remain determinative of the issue 
of alienability of debtor's rights. The silence of the commentators as to any 
change made by§ 9-311 to existing Delaware law contributes to the conclusion 
that§ 9-311 made no change in Delaware's long-standing policy in the matter. 
Certainly, if a reversal of law was sought the Act itself or the commentators 
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erable since it stimulates bidding and thus ensures the highest 
price possible.40 
C. Conversion of the Collateral 
As an alternative to an action for possession of the collateral, 
the secured party may wish to assert a claim for conversion against 
either the lien creditor or third party purchaser. This is especially 
true when, for one reason or another, the collateral is no longer 
available. Whether such an action will be successful will depend 
upon the circumstances of the particular case and the court in 
which the. claim is asserted. 
1. The lien creditor's liability for conversion. The notion that 
merely setting the wheels of a sheriff's sale in motion constitutes a 
conversion was squarely rejected in Citizens Bank v. Perrin & 
Sons.41 Relying on section 9-311, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
concluded th~t the action of a creditor in causing collateral to be 
sold under attachment could not in itself be wrongful.42 The 
court, however, made it clear that its holding was limited to just 
the "bare sale of the property. " 48 It distinguished the situation 
before it, in which the security interest was in no way adversely 
affected, from those involving the impairment of the secured 
party's position to some degree."" 
Whether any court is prepared to hold that merely causing 
the sale of collateral is in fact a conversion is not without doubt. 
would have made mention of such an important change. 
Id. at 12. Thus, the court was definitely of the opinion that U.C.C. § 9-311 is not self-
executing. The court distinguished Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 204 So. 2d 704 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), and First Nat'l Bank v. Sheriff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis. 2d 
535, 149 N.W.2d 548 (1967), on the fact that the Florida and Wisconsin legislatures "sanc-
tioned the continuance of the security interest for the lien holder .... " Maryland Nat'l 
Bank, 300 A.2d at 12. 
40. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 300 A.2d at 12. 
41. 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14 (1972). 
42. Id at 640-41, 488 S.W.2d at 15. 
43. Id. 
44. As examples of what the case before it did not involve, the court referred to First 
Nat'! Bank v. Stamper, 93 NJ. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (1969) ("the transportation of a 
car to another state, where title was registered in the name of an innocent purchaser"); 
United States v. McCleasky Mills, 409 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969), and United States v. Pete 
Brown Enters., 328 F. Supp. 600 (D. Miss. 1971) ("the sale of commodities subject to 
processing, such as slaughtered chickens or raw peanuts"). See Citizens Bank, 253 Ark. at 
641, 488 S.W.2d at 15. 
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Though some cases appear to have so held, there were additional 
facts in these cases which arguably led the courts to reach that 
result. In affirming a finding of conversion against a levying credi-
tor, the court in Murdock v. Blake415 explained, in what would be-
come a much-quoted passage, that 
(o]ne who has possession or an immediate right to possession, such as a chat-
tel mortgagee or conditional seller after default, may maintain an action for 
conversion against one who has exercised unauthorized acts of dominion 
over the property of another in exclusion or denial of his rights or inconsis-
tent therewith.48 
One fact noted by the court was that the secured party informed 
the levying creditor's attorney of the security interest and admon-
ished him that legal action would be taken if the sale was consum-
mated. 47 One could argue that the case would not have been de-
cided the same way had this fact been absent. Similar facts may 
have caused other courts to reach similar conclusions.48 
In Cooper v. Citizens Bank,49 the levying creditor's undoing 
may have been caused not by the mere act of levy but by the fact 
that the levy occurred in Georgia after the debtor removed the 
collateral from Florida.150 Perhaps what swayed the court was that 
the levy impaired the secured party's position by making a bad 
45. 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 956 {1971). 
46. Id. at 30, 484 P.2d at 169, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 961 (citing First Nat'l Bank, 93 
NJ. Super. at 156-57, 225 A.2d at 165-66). The opinion emphasized "that [the secured 
party] was entitled to possession based on [debtor's] default; if [the debtor] had not been in 
default, [the secured party] would merely be entitled to assert its priority and right to the 
proceeds." 26 Utah 2d at 30 n.14, 484 P.2d at 170 n.14, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 961 n.14. 
The secured party's right to receive proceeds is discussed infra notes 123-45 and accompa-
nying text. 
47. Id. at 25, 484 P.2d at 166, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 958. 
48. E.g., American Fin. Co. v. First Nat'I Bank, 134 Ga. App. 24, 24, 217 S.E.2d 364, 
365 (1975) ("[o]ne hour before the scheduled sale, [the secured party] advised [the lien 
creditor] by telephone of its security interest in the seized automobile and requested that 
the sale should not take place"). In both American Fin. Co. and Murdock the measure of 
conversion damages was apparently the market value of the collateral on the day of the 
execution sale. This presupposes that the act of conversion was the sale, not the levy. Per-
haps, but for the preceding demand by the secured party, neither court would have been 
prepared to base liability solely on the act of sale. 
49. 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369 (1973). 
50. Id. at 261-62, 199 S.E.2d at 371. One interesting facet of this case was the court's 
reluctance to impose liability on the execution sale purchaser without a showing that he in 
some way participated in the levy or in the diminution of the value of the collateral. Id. at 
263, 199 S.E.2d at 372. Implicit in this position is the idea that the conversion occurs at 
the time of levy. 
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situation worse. 
2. The execution sale purchaser's liability far conversion. It is un-
likely that any court would hold that the mere act of purchase at a 
sheriff's sale gives rise to a cause of action for conversion.151 This is 
especially true if at the time of purchase the debtor is not in de-
fault.152 Courts, however, have not permitted a purchaser to escape 
liability if in addition to purchasing the collateral he or she does 
more than nominally impair the secured party's interest.158 
3. Measure of damages. The measure of damages for conver-
sion is usually stated to be the value of the property at the time of 
conversion. tu The apparent simplicity of this rule tends to belie 
difficulties which can arise in its application, and as a result courts 
have not given the issue of damages the attention it deserves. 
Since the valuation date depends upon the conversion date, a de-
termination of the time the conversion occurred is critical. With 
no explanation courts have not always attached the same legal sig-
nificance to the same act.1515 
It also is not clear whether courts really intend that the dam-
51. Id. One case which arguably supports the proposition that the mere act of 
purchase constitutes a conversion is National Shawmut Bank v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 223 
N.E.2d 515 (1967), the facts of which do not disclose any conduct by the purchaser, other 
than the purchase itself, which adversely affected the interests of the secured party. How-
ever, after concluding that the purchaser took subject to the lien of the secured party, the 
court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 17-18, 223 N.E.2d at 518-19. If the act of 
purchase alone constituted a conversion, why was a new trial necessary? The opinion does 
not provide an answer. 
52. Smith v. Guzman, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 852 (N.Y. ~up. Ct. 1975); Royal Store 
Fixture Co. v. New Jersey Butter Co., 114 NJ. Super. 263, 276 A.2d 153, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 1391 (1971); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
956 (1971). 
53. E.g., RO)•al Store Fixture Co., 114 NJ. Super. at 267, 276 A.2d at 156, 8 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 1394 (1971) (after purchase the collateral was removed from Pennsylvania to 
New Jersey); Smith, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 852 (the purchaser resold the collateral know-
ing of the secured party's interest). 
54. Cooper, 129 Ga. App. at 262, 199 S.E.2d at 371-72; Murdock, 26 Utah 2d at 30, 
484 P.2d at 169-70, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 961. For further discussion of this issue, see 
infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
55. Compare Cooper, 129 Ga. App. at 262, 199 S.E.2d at 371-72 (the conversion occurs 
when the sheriff seizes the collateral) with Smith, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975), and Murdock, 26 Utah 2d at 30, 484 P.2d at 169-70, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 961 (the 
conversion occurs when the collateral is sold). See also supra note 48. One possible explana-
tion for the courts' relative inattentiveness to this issue is that the market value of the 
collateral was likely to have remained fairly constant from the date of levy to the date of 
sale. 
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age rule be applied literally in all cases. Suppose, for example, that 
the value of the collateral on the date of conversion exceeds the 
amount of the secured debt. This possibility was recognized by 
only one court; surprisingly, this court sanctioned the recovery by 
the secured party with the extraordinary proviso that the debtor 
was entitled to any amount recovered by the secured party in ex-
cess of the debt.GS When determining value, courts agree that al-
though evidence of what the collateral brought at the execution 
sale is admissible, it is not binding on the question.117 
II. A SUGGESTED ORDERING OF INTERESTS 
Any suggestion of how to order the respective interests of the 
secured party and lien creditor must account for the rejection of 
two quite simple but polar solutions.158 One possible solution is to 
give the secured party the right to have any levy set aside without 
an attendant obligation either to dispose of the collateral or ac-
count to the lien creditor for any surplus beyond the amount of 
the secured debt. This approach would, in most cases, preclude 
creditor access to debtor's equity. The other extreme would per-
mit the execution sale to take place with the purchaser taking free 
of the security interest. The secured party would, however, have a 
priority position in the proceeds. Though an argument can be 
made in favor of either solution, it can be shown that neither is 
tenable. 
Although the notion that the debtor's equity should be availa-
ble to his or her creditors has a certain intuitive appeal, that alone 
does not justify rejection of the first mentioned solution. It is rea-
sonable to assume that most creditors would be aware of a rule 
which insulates debtors' equity and would recognize that it has the 
effect of increasi~g the risk of their claims.119 In response to this 
56. Cooper, 129 Ga. App. at 263, 199 S.E.2d at 372. It has been suggested that courts 
apply the usual measure of damages without much thought because the market value of the 
collateral is usually less than the amount of secured debt. See Nickles, supra note 10, at 537. 
Such was clearly the case in Murdock, 26 Utah 2d at 30, 484 P.2d at 169-70, 8 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. at 961. 
57. Murdock, 26 Utah 2d at 30, 484 P.2d at 170, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 961. See also 
American Fin. Co. v. First Nat'I Bank, 134 Ga. App. at 25-26, 217 S.E.2d at 366. 
58. See generally Henderson, supra note 11, and Justice, supra note 35, both of whom 
recognize, but reject, both extremes. 
59. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1147-48 n.22: "For any given loan, a 
creditor will face a number of possible outcomes ranging from prompt repayment of all 
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increased risk, a creditor will either demand increased compensa-
tion in the form of a higher rate of interest or take some action to 
reduce the risk.60 This suggests that if "creditors remain free to 
select their own debtors and to set the terms on which they will 
lend, there is no compelling argument based on considerations of 
fairness for adopting one legal rule . . . rather than an-
other .... " 61 
This argument, however, ignores the advantages which result 
from a legal rule, the effect of which is to lower the debtor's over-
all cost of credit. 62 Although at the outset it matters little to credi-
tors, secured or otherwise, which legal rule is adopted (each re-
ceives a return concomitant with risk), debtors are quite 
interested in which legal rule is selected. If the potential benefit 
from a particular allocation of risk were great enough, a debtor 
would likely agree to share a portion of this benefit with his or 
her creditors if their cooperation were needed. Creditor coopera-
tion becomes necessary when adherence to existing legal rules 
would produce a less favorable result for the debtor. Since a coop-
eration premium would make creditors better off, it is expected 
that they would agree to act in a manner consistent with the best 
interests of the debtor. Consequently, if permitting access to the 
debtor's equity would lower the debtor's overall costs, all creditors 
would agree to this regardless of the applicable legal rules. 68 
The efficient legal rule is one which mirrors this imagined 
principal and interest to failure by the debtor to pay any part of either." In the event 
debtor fails to voluntarily satisfy his or her obligation it is apparent that any obstacle placed 
in the path of creditor's collection efforts must have the effect of decreasing the likelihood 
of success. As this possibility increases, so will the perceived riskiness of the original exten-
sion of credit. 
60. Restrictive covenants in the loan agreement or otherwise which attempt to control 
debtor behavior may often serve as risk reducers. It is also possible that potential creditors 
will demand that their extensions of credit be secured. Id. at 1148 n.23. 
61. Id. at 1148. 
62. The benefits which result from a decrease in debtor's cost of credit have already 
been developed at great length and need not be fully reviewed here. See, e.g., Jackson and 
Kronman, supra note 3, passim. 
63. The "creditor's bargain model" is useful for analyzing the allocative efficiency and 
fairness of legal rules. As applied here, it serves to compare the rule in question with that 
to which the parties would have agreed had they been able to negotiate beforehand. For 
the application of this model in other contexts, see id. (justifying the allowance of secured 
credit) and Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor's Bargain, 91 
YALE L.j. 857 (1982) (testing the efficiency of recognizing certain non-bankruptcy entitle-
ments in a bankruptcy proceeding). 
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consensual agreement.a. Whether access to debtor's equity will re-
duce his or her credit cost depends upon how it affects the per-
ceived risk of creditor claims. If access is permitted, the risk to the 
secured party will increase, and with it the rate of return de-
manded. If this increase is more than offset by the resultant de-
crease in debtor's total cost of unsecured credit, the debtor will 
experience a net cost saving. It is reasonable to assume that such 
will be the case if the interests of competing creditors are ordered 
in such a fashion as to make debtor's equity available to his or her 
creditors, while at the same time preserving the basic expectations 
of the secured party. 
There exists an even more compelling reason for adoption of 
an "access to equity" rule. A creditor who is unable to satisfy a 
claim because of the existence of one or more secured parties has 
an incentive to push for some type of collective insolvency pro-
ceeding in which the debtor's equity is available to unsecured 
creditors. At the time of the creditor's push, however, it may not 
be in the best interests of the debtor's other creditors for the 
debtor to be involved in such a proceeding.611 Because of the num-
ber of creditors and free-rider66 problems, it usually would be dif-
ficult for the pushing creditor to negotiate with other creditors so 
as to receive its insolvency entitlement and hence to refrain from 
the push.67 Refusing to accord creditors access to a debtor's equity 
64. It has been suggested that 
[f]acing positive transaction costs, ••• the legal system provides ready-made 
rules based on common assumptions about typical contracting behavior. These 
"off the rack" contract rules reduce the costs of exchange by specifying the 
legal consequences of typical bargains where the expected cost of explicit nego-
tiation exceeds the utility derived from individualized exchange. 
Jackson and Kronman, supra note 3, at 1157 n.53 (citing Goetz Sc Scott, Liquidated Dam· 
ages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 554, 588 n.87 (1977)). 
65. Professor Jackson points out that, because of the potential disharmony of credi-
tors' claims, bankruptcy often involves "complex, costly, and potentially intractable negoti· 
ations •.•• "Jackson, supra note 63, at 876. "[A] private arrangement is faster, cheaper, 
and more satisfactory all around-that is, if all the creditors join in." LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PRoBS., Aug. 1977, at 123, 171 (transcript of seminar discussion of legal and economic 
considerations in bankruptcy reform conducted by the Law and Economics Center of the 
University of Miami School of Law; statement by Peter F. Coogan). 
66. The term "freerider" is often used to refer to someone who relies on and hopes to 
capitalize on the efforts of others. See generally Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commer· 
cial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982). 
67. See generally Jackson, supra note 63, at 904. 
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outside of the insolvency process may therefore result in an ineffi-
cient use of that process. This "insolvency incentive" problem will 
arise whenever a creditor enjoys an entitlement in an insolvency 
proceeding not enjoyed outside of that proceeding.68 
The other extreme solution, permitting the. execution sale to 
occur with the purchaser taking free of the security interest, 
would also have disadvantageous consequences. It is plausible to 
view the right of the secured party to take possession of the collat-
eral and control its disposition upon the debtor's default as the 
sine qua non of a security interest. 69 If a subsequent levy can de-
prive a secured party of Article 9 remedies, the secured party will 
most certainly view his or her claim as riskier. This increased risk 
will affect the debtor directly in the form of higher credit charges. 
Though a debtor's total cost of credit might possibly be reduced 
because of the improved position of unsecured creditors, the re-
duction will not be maximized given the drastic consequences to 
the secured party. To achieve the efficiencies concomitant with se-
cured credit, 70 its benefits should not be reduced beyond that 
which is necessary. It is possible and hence more efficient to allow 
access to debtors' equity without, at the same time, upsetting the 
expectations of the secured party. 
Moreover, while a disposition by the secured party would 
maximize proceeds, an execution sale would decrease the value of 
the collateral and increase the likelihood of a deficiency or a 
larger deficiency,71 much to the debtor's disadvantage. In light of 
the foregoing it is surprising that the Delaware Supreme Court 
explicitly approved of this latter position.7:1 In this court's opinion, 
[c]hattels sold at an execution sale should be sold free and clear of all en-
cumbrances in order to ensure the highest price and to stimulate bidding. 
The creditor with the highest priority is not prejudiced in his reliance on the 
value of the chattel to secure the debt since he is satisfied first from the 
68. Id. at 887-92, 901-06 (discussing ipso facto clauses, state-created priorities, and 
bankruptcy statutory liens). 
69. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 195; and Justice, supra note 35, at 434. Both 
authors assert that the price received as the result of a disposition by the secured party will 
usually exceed that which would be obtained as the result of a sheriff's sale. 
70. See generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 3, at 1149-58 (discussing the benefits 
of secured credit). 
71. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 195. 
72. See discussion of Maryland Nat'! Bank v. Porter-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 
A.2d 8 (Del. 1972), supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
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proceeds.73 
This view is flawed in that it fails to recognize that the disposition 
objective should be to maximize the value of the collateral. This is 
not accomplished, regardless of whether the highest execution 
sale price is ensured, if disposition by the secured party would re-
sult in an even higher price. In addition, the secured party would 
not likely be amenable to this arrangement. 74 
Having rejected these two extreme positions, this Article sug-
gests an alternative solution which allows creditor access to a 
debtor's equity, and, at the same time, recognizes and gives effect 
to the superior interest of the secured party.7G 
A. U.C.C. section 9-311 and the Lien Creditor's Right of Levy 
Arguments which justify the right of a creditor to levy on col-
lateral are one thing, but finding authorization for a levy under 
the law of a particular jurisdiction is another. In the absence of 
express statutory authorization,78 determining the impact of sec-
tion 9-311 77 is critical. It is the only Code section which speaks 
directly to the issue of whether a debtor's interest in collateral can 
be reached by his or her creditors. 
The particular purpose and effect of this section has never 
73. 300 A.2d at 12. 
74. For one thing a deficiency may result, which is less likely to occur when the se-
cured party controls the collateral's disposition. Also, such an approach deprives the se-
cured party of his or her right to propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the 
secured debt. See U.C.C. § 9-505. 
75. This Article assumes that the approach suggested is not precluded in whole or in 
part by a contrary legislative response. Though most jurisdictions have not enacted special 
legislation to deal with the secured party /lien creditor conflict, some have. Some of these 
statutes provide for satisfaction of the secured debt before sale. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 223, §§ 74-75 (West 1958 & Supp. 1983); MoNT. REv. CoDF.S ANN. § 25-13-505 
(1983). Others provide for satisfaction after sale, from the proceeds. See, e.g., N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 528:8, 511:26 (1974 & Supp. 1983); KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN.§ 60-2406 
(Vernon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-26-9 (1956). This type of legislation has the same effect 
and negative consequences as would recognition of the continuation of the secured party's 
interest in the proceeds. See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text. 
Implicit in the following discussion is also the assumption that the collateral is not third-
party-obligation collateral such as an account or promissory note. Because of the necessary 
introduction of a third-party obligor into the scenario and the dissipative nature of the 
collateral, permitting creditor access would raise a number of unique issues. This is not to 
suggest, however, that creditor access should be denied. 
76. See supra note 75. 
77. For the full text of§ 9-311, see supra note 24. 
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been clear. When the Code was first offered to the states for adop-
tion, some commentators thought that section 9-311 declared 
void any provision in the security agreement prohibiting the 
transfer of collateral or making such transfer constitute a de-
fault. 78 It has been suggested that this conclusion finds support in 
the evolution of the section. 79 
In the 1949 Draft, the predecessor to section 9-311 read, in 
part: "Notwithstanding any forfeiture or title retention terms in a 
lien agreement, the borrower's interest in the collateral may be 
reached by attachment, levy or other appropriate judicial process 
•••• "
80 Later, in the 1952 Official Draft, the section read: "The 
debtor's rights in collateral (a) are alienable, although the security 
agreement may make disposition without the secured party's con-
sent a default; and (b) may be reached by attachment, levy, gar-
nishment or other appropriate judicial process. "81 The section was 
again officially amended in 1958 to read as it does today.82 
In light of the drafting history, it is arguable that a clause in 
the security agreement making an involuntary transfer an event of 
default is invalid because (1) the successive amendments reflect a 
growing concern with such a default clause and its adverse impact 
upon the debtor and third parties; (2) the default provision now 
applies to both voluntary and involuntary transfers; and (3) if a 
clause prohibiting the transfer of collateral is rendered void by 
this section, an accompanying reference to a default clause means 
that it, too, is void. 88 
Concerned that such an interpretation of section 9-311 would 
unjustifiably impair the interests of secured parties, some states 
amended the official version of the section to make it clear that it 
does not prohibit a clause in a security agreement declaring a 
transfer of collateral, whether voluntary or involuntary, to be an 
event of default.84 The commentators who have considered this 
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-311 study comment (1967); IND. ConE ANN.§ 26-1-
311 comment (Burns 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A: 9-311 study comment note 1 (West 
1962). See also Henderson, supra note 11, at 198-99; Special Project, California Chattel Se-
curity and Article 9 of the U.C.C., 8 UCLA L. REv. 806, 975-76 (1961). 
79. Note, supra note 11, at 528-29. 
80. u.c.c. § 7-113 (1949). 
81. u.c.c. § 9-311 (1952). 
82. u.c.c. § 9-311 (1957). 
83. See Note, supra note 11, at 528-29; Special Project, supra note 78, at 976. 
84. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-3132 (1980); CAL. U. CoMM. CODE § 9311 (West 
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issue agree that such clauses are valid. These commentators uni-
formly recognize that because of the vicissitudes of personal prop-
erty, the secured party has a legitimate interest in the identity of 
the person who holds the collateral.88 That the intent of this sec-
tion was never to void such default clauses is evidenced by the 
following retort of the permanent editorial board of the U .C.C. to 
the California amendment to section 9-311: "This variation 
merely makes explicit what must fairly be implied from the lan-
guage omitted. " 88 
If the purpose of section 9-311 is not to invalidate a "transfer 
equals default clause," then what is its purpose? On this point the 
official comments are particularly helpful. Comment 1 states that 
the purpose of the section is "[t]o make clear that in all security 
transactions under this Article, the debtor has an interest 
(whether legal title or an equity) which he can dispose of and 
which his creditors can reach." It has been suggested that this sec-
tion is simply another example of the Code's general rejection of 
title as a test for determining the rights of the parties. 87 Support 
for this is found in Official Comment 2, which states: 
Supp. 1983), which expressly validates such clauses. For instance, Arizona amended § 9-
311 to read: 
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred 
(by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnishment or 
other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement 
prohibiting any transfer except where a security interest is indicated on a certif-
icate of title to such collateral as required by the laws of this state in which case 
such collateral may not be transferred without the written consent of the se-
cured party. A pravision in the security agreement making the transfer constitute a 
default is valid. 
(Emphasis added). 
85. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 199; Special Project, supra note 78, at 976. 
86. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT No. 2, 
at 218 (1965). 
87. Professor Gilmore writes that "[t]he § 9-311 provision followed logically from § 9-
202 which, with respect to 'rights, obligations and remedies,' makes it irrelevant whether 
title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor." He goes on, however, to note 
that "by accident if not by design, § 9-311 takes care of the negative covenant very nicely" 
in that § 9-311 
evidently contemplates that the negative covenant is effective between the par-
ties: the debtor's violation of the covenant, either by making a voluntary trans-
fer or by suffering an involuntary one, may 'constitute a default.' The covenant 
is clearly enough looked on as what the pre-Code case law calls a 'personal' one: 
it will have no effect against third parties but will give the covenantee a right of 
action against the covenantor for its breach. 
2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERsoNAL PROPERTY § 38.5, at 1017-18 (1965). 
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Some jurisdictions have held that when a mortgagee or conditional seller has 
"title" to the collateral, creditors may not proceed against the mortgagor's 
or vendee's interest by levy, attachment or other judicial process. This sec-
tion changes those rules by providing that in all security interests the 
debtor's interest in the collateral remains subject to claims of creditors who 
take appropriate action. It is left to the law of each state to determine the 
form of "appropriate process". 
Prior to the Code and its adoption of a unitary personal-
property security device, 88 there was a divergence of views regard-
ing whether the interest of a mortgagor of personal property 
could be reached by his or her creditors. This lack of uniformity 
was caused, in part, by the inability of courts to agree on the na-
ture of the property rights possessed by the mortgagor. Such was 
the inevitable consequence of the pre-Code obsession with the 
metaphysical concept of title89 which influenced the historical de-
velopment of postjudgment enforcement procedures.90 As a prac-
88. Under Article 9, 
the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are 
not retained; the Article applies to all transactions intended to create security 
interests in personal property and fixtures, and the single term "security inter-
est" substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms which had grown up at com-
mon law and under a hundred-year accretion of statutes. 
U.C.C. § 9-101 comment. 
89. Prior to the U.C.C., many commercial problems were resolved by "resorting to 
the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass •.•• " U.C.C. § 2-101 comment. 
The potential difficulties in locating title at a given point in the life of a commercial trans-
action have long been recognized. See, e.g., 1 Hearings Before the New York Law Revision Com-
mission on the Uniform Commercial Code 96 (1954) (statement of Karl Llewelyn); J. WHITE&: 
R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-1 (2d ed. 1980) ("[w]ho had title and what 
caused title to pass from the seller to the buyer were often mysteries to both lawyers and 
the courts," id. at 176). The drafters of the U.C.C. sought "to avoid making practical is-
sues between practical men tum upon the location of an intangible something, the passing 
of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of 
words and actions of a tangible character." U.C.C. § 2-101 comment. Thus the solution of 
many commercial problems formerly dependent upon the location of title, such as risk of 
loss, are now resolved on a more practical basis. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-509 and 2-510. It 
should be noted, however, that the U.C.C. does contain a title section; U.C.C. § 2-401, to 
"be followed in cases where the applicability of 'public' regulation depends upon • • • loca-
tion of 'title' ••.• " U.C.C. § 2-401 comment I. 
90. The most common procedures were execution and levy, garnishment, and the 
creditor's bill. Writs of execution and the process of garnishment were developed by the 
common law courts, and being legal devices could not be used to reach equitable interests. 
1 A. FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS§ 116 (3d ed. 1900). See Young v. Schofield, 132 Mo. 650, 653, 
34 S.W. 497, 501 (1896) ("at common law the equitable interest of a debtor in chattels was 
not the subject of sale under execution"). See also State v. Nolte, 203 S.W. 956, 959 (Mo. 
1918); Ottumwa Nat'! Bank v. Totten, 94 Mo. App. 596, 597, 68 S.W. 386, 388 (1902). 
The mortgagor's interest, if characterized as equitable, could be reached, if at all, by resort 
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tical matter, the ability of a judgment creditor to reach the inter-
est of the mortgagor was dependent on the availability of the legal 
device of execution and levy. 91 
The characterization of the mortgagor's interest as either eq-
uitable or legal was often a result of the type of personal-property 
security device used. 92 If, for example, the operative device was 
either the pledge93 or the chattel mortgage" most courts were of 
the opinion that the pledgor or mortgagor retained only an equi-
table interest, hence the collateral was not subject to execution 
and levy. 915 On the other hand, in the case of the conditional 
to a creditor's bill. See Note, supra note 11, at 520-21. The categories of"legal" and "equi-
table" interest were, therefore, the traditional touchstones by which courts determined the 
relative provinces of their post:iudgment procedures. 
91. The creditor's bill was not always a satisfactory alternative because it could be· 
come an extremely cumbersome device. See Ward, supra note 8, at 255. 
Creditor's bill consists of two distinct parts. The bill's discovery prayer is 
designed to compel defendants to disclose assets. Pursuant to such a prayer, a 
creditor requests that the court question the debtor and third parties in order 
to locate assets which can be applied to the judgment. By separate prayer the 
creditor asks the court to apply the debtor's property to the judgment. The 
court can enjoin the debtor from conveying or encumbering any property dis-
covered, and can appoint a receiver to take over discovered property. 
Id. at 256. 
In addition to the two-part procedure under a creditor's bill, the creditor "was typically 
required to show that his writ of execution had been returned nulla bona." Id. at 255. See 
also Bouget v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 287 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1968); 
Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979). 
92. Prior to the U.C.C., there were numerous personal-property security devices, each 
operating within its own province. The most typical were the "pledge," the "chattel mort-
gage" and the "conditional sale." For a detailed discussion of all the various pre-Code 
devices, see generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 87, at §§ 1.1-8.8. 
93. The debtor or pledgor would deliver possession of the collateral to the creditor or 
pledgee. If the pledgee failed to satisfy his or her obligation when due, the pledgee was 
empowered to sell the collateral and retain those proceeds necessary to satisfy the obliga-
tion. Id. at §§ 1.1-1.6. 
94. The debtor or mortgagor would give to the creditor or mortgagee a mortgage on 
the collateral. In the event that the mortgagor defaulted on his or her obligation, the 
mortgagee was permitted to take possession and dispose of the collateral. Prior to an event 
of default, possession of the collateral usually remained with the mortgagor. Unlike the 
conditional sale, the debtor usually had an interest in the collateral prior to incurring his 
or her obligation to the creditor. Id. at §§ 2.1-2.8. 
95. In the case of the pledge, execution and levy was thought to interfere with the 
rights of the pledgee. 
The only obstacle to the sale of pledged property is that, the pledgee being 
entitled to the possession, the officer has no right to seize upon the property in 
violation of the rights of the pledgee • • •• An officer acting under an execu-
tion cannot by his levy obtain or transfer any greater interest in the property 
than was possessed by the [pledgor] at the time of the levy. 
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sale, 96 courts were in disagreement over the correct labeling of 
the debtor's interest.97 
It appears reasonably certain from official Code comments 
and the pre-Code state of affairs98 that one purpose of section 9-
311 was to allow for the alienability of the debtor's equity in the 
collateral by way of an involuntary transfer, regardless of the fact 
that the transfer would constitute a default under the terms of the 
security agreement.99 
Although the purpose of the section is arguably clear, its ef-
fect on pre-existing law is not. One commentator posits that 
Newman v. Mantle, 109 Ky. 292, 293, 58 S.W. 783, 784 (1900). 
If a chattel mortgage was being used, most courts felt that title to the property was 
"conveyed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee subject to being divested upon timely pay-
ment of the debt which gave rise to the transaction." Note, supra note 11, at 516. As a 
result of this so-called title theory, it was often held that the mortgagor did not retain an 
interest which was subject to execution and levy. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at§ 117. 
See, e.g., Jennings v. Mcllroy, 42 Ark. 236 (1883); Holbrook v. Baker, 5 Me. 309 (1828); 
Haven v. Low, 2 N.H. 13 (1819); Erdman v. Erdman, 109 Ark. l!H, 159 S.W. 201 (1913). 
A few courts avoided such a harsh result by concluding that, even though title vested in the 
mortgagee, the mortgagor did retain a legal interest in the property (i.e., present posses-
sion and the possibility of reverter). Note, supra note 11, at 516. See, e.g., Ex parte Logan, 
185 Ala. 525, 64 So. 570 (1914); Second Nat'! Bank v. Gilbert, 174 Ill. 485, 51 N.E. 584 
(1898); Mueller v. Provo, 80 Mich. 475, 45 N.W. 498 (1890); Smith v. Beattie, 31 N.Y. 542 
(1865); Stewart v. Wheeling 8c L.E.R. Co., 53 Ohio St. 151, 41 N.E. 247 (1895); Lane v. 
Baughman, 17 Ohio St. 642 (1867). This leviable interest was thought to vanish, however, 
when defaulting mortagor's possession depended on the whims of the mortgagee. Note, 
supra note 11, at 517-18. See, e.g., Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 Mich. 104 (1854); Manning v. 
Monaghan, 28 N.Y. 585 (1864); Green v. Powell, 46 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. App. 1932); 
Haueisen v. Szalay, 33 Ohio App. 350, 169 N.E. 602 (1929). 
96. The conditional sale was used primarily by sellers to secure all or a portion of the 
purchase price. Conceptually, it was said that the seller retained title to the collateral until 
the purchase price had been paid in full. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 87, at§§ 3.1-3.8. 
97. If the vendee, at the time of the levy, had the right to possession of the goods, it 
was often thought that this interest was leviable. See 13 N.Y.U. L. REv. 611, 625 nn.14-16 
(1936); Note, Conditional Sales-Interest of Conditional Buyer of Personal Property-ls it Attach-
able1, 13 MINN. L. REv. 247, 248 n.4 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Note, Conditional Sales]. 
On the other hand, there were courts which denied the right to levy irrespective of the 
vendee's right to continued possession. See 13 N.Y.U. L. REv. at 624; Note, Leuy of Attach-
ment and Execution on Buyer's Interest Under Conditional Sales Contract, 42 W. VA. L.Q. 152 
(1936). Once an event of default had occurred, the vendee's legal interest was thought to 
vanish and the goods became immune from execution and levy. See Note, Conditional Sales, 
supra, at 249 8c n.11. 
98. That pre-Code law should be considered when interpreting and applying provi-
sions of the Code was recognized by Professor Gilmore, who stated: "The solid stuff of pre. 
Code law will furnish the rationale of decision quite as often as the Code's own gossamer 
substance.'' Gilmore, Article 9: What it Does far the Past, 26 LA. L. REv. 285, 286 (1966). 
99. Accord Hogan, Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C. LJ. 244, 246-47 (1970) (dis-
cussing voluntary transfers of collateral). 
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[s]ince the drafters wanted to change existing state law as little as possible, 
they listed the three principal methods of reaching this interest at 
law-attachment, execution, garnishment-and used the term "other judi-
cial process" to cover such procedures as sequestration, trustee process and 
creditor's bill. Hence, the provisions of this section are satisfied if the 
debtor's interest can be reached in any one of these ways even though it can 
be reached in no other way.100 
Under this rationale, the section would effect no change in those 
jurisdictions which, though labeling the debtor's interest as equi-
table, nevertheless permitted its alienability by creditor's bill or 
otherwise.101 
In light of the drafter's approach to the idea that the location 
of title is determinative of legal rights,102 it is unlikely that no 
change in prior law was intended by the inclusion of section 9-311 
in the Code. It is true that the section does not provide a means 
by which a creditor can reach the debtor's interest. That it was 
not intended to be self-executing can be inferred from the state-
ment in Official Comment 2 that "[i]t is left to the law of each 
state to determine the form of 'appropriate process.' " 103 What it 
does, however, is give the debtor a legal interest in the collateral 
which would then be accessible to creditors by resort to the appro-
priate legal devices. This conclusion would change the law in 
those jurisdictions which would otherwise label the debtor's inter-
est as equitable and thus beyond the scope of legal process.1M 
Section 9-311 may also have the effect of insulating the credi-
100. See Note, supra note 11, at 526. 
101. Id. 
102. See supra note 89. 
103. See Maryland Nat'l Bank, 300 A.2d at 12. See also supra notes 35-40, 72-74 and 
accompanying text. 
104. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-311 comment (1963). See also Citizens Bank, 253 Ark. 
at 639, 488 S.W.2d at 14; New Jersey Bank v. Community Association/Farms, Inc., 666 
F.2d 813 (3d Cir.), 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 963 (1981). 
The right of levy should not be affected by the fact that the secured party is in posses-
sion of the collateral. An additional problem arises when the secured party is relying on his 
or her possession to perfect the security interest. How can a sheriff take possession without 
thereby relegating the secured party to the status of unperfected? One commentator sug· 
gests that "the sheriff should be viewed as a bailee with notice of the secured party's inter· 
est within the meaning of the second sentence of section 9-305." Ward, supra note 8, at 
238. But after sale it would be difficult to view the purchaser as the type of bailee contem-
plated by § 9-305. Perhaps a better solution would be to allow the secured party to file a 
financing statement without the debtor's signature pursuant to § 9-402(2), which should 
not be viewed as containing an exhaustive list of circumstances authorizing such a filing. 
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tor from conversion liability to the secured party.105 Since an in-
voluntary transfer is expressly sanctioned, it would seem that the 
taking of the collateral pursuant to the appropriate process, with-
out more, is not wrongful and, hence, not a conversion. It would 
make no difference whether the creditor proceeds against the col-
lateral before or after the debtor's default under the terms of the 
security agreement.108 This interpretation would change the pre-
Code law in some jurisdictions.107 
Assuming that the debtor's interest is subject to involuntary 
transfer, either because of or without regard to section 9-311, the 
Code is nevertheless silent on how the competing interests of the 
secured party and the creditor are to be reconciled. Both have 
interests which need protection, but which often conflict. 
B. The Secured Party's Right to Vacate the Levy and Recover 
Possession From the Sheriff 
Without the correlative right of the secured party to pursue 
remedies under Part Five of Article 9, the value of the security 
interest is substantially lessened.108 Therefore, full recognition of 
the secured party's priority position requires courts to allow se-
cured parties to vacate any levy and take possession of collateral. 
Most courts have recognized that a priority position under Article 
9 carries with it a superior possessory right. Many have, in fact, 
allowed secured parties to vacate levies and take possession of col-
lateral, but the doctrinal justification for this decision has not 
often been articulated.109 These courts have concluded simply 
that the lien creditor's interest must yield to the secured party's 
right under section 9-503 to take possession of the collateral upon 
the debtor's default.110 But this argument is problematic.111 The 
105. See Note, supra note 11, at 527; Henderson, supra note 11, at 209; Citizens Bank, 
253 Ark. at 639, 488 S.W.2d at 14. See also infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text. 
106. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 210. 
107. See Note, supra note 11, at 527. 
108. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra notes 14-40 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text. 
111. A secured party attempting to recover possession of the collateral subsequent to 
levy on the strength of§ 9-503 does not face the interpretative problem which exists when 
recovery is sought from a subordinate secured party. As Professor Nickles points out: 
Section 9-503 gives 'a secured party' the right to possession of the collateral on 
the debtor's default; neither this right nor the section 9-504 right to dispose of 
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conclusory nature of it becomes apparent by its failure to respond 
to the contrary contention: that the secured party's right of pos-
session given by section 9-503 should yield to the lien creditor's 
right of levy. What is needed is a more persuasive reason for 
awarding possession to the secured party. 
Unless there exists an applicable exception, the general rule is 
that the sheriff, by the act of levy, cannot acquire greater rights in 
the property levied upon than the rights which the debtor had.111 
Article 9 does provide a limited exception by awarding a lien 
creditor priority over a pre-existing secured party in certain cir-
cumstances.118 If the levy occurs after the secured party's interest 
has attached but before it is perfected, the lien creditor's priority 
should enable the sheriff to deal with the collateral as if it were 
not subject to the security interest. Assuming that the interest of a 
secured party has priority, however, this limited exception be-
comes immaterial. 
Prior to the occurrence of an event of default, 114 the debtor 
will usually have the right to possess, use, and sometimes even to 
dispose of the collateral. Interference with these rights, even by 
the secured party, may result in liability for conversion.115 After 
collateral after repossession is granted exclusively to senior secured parties. 
Thus, the junior creditor may contend that because he, too, has the statutory 
rights to repossess the collateral and foreclose, the senior secured party cannot 
retake the property from him. 
Nickles, supra note 12, at 219 (citations omitted). Sections 9-503 and 9-504, however, make 
no mention of lien creditors. 
112. See A. FREEMAN, supra note 90, § 195, at 1005. Professor Freeman stated that 
[i]n the absence of a statutory provision giving it some greater effect, an execu-
tion lien, like that of a judgment, attaches to the real rather than the apparent 
interest of the defendant. If the title held by him is subject to equities of third 
persons, the execution lien is also subordinate to such equities. "The fountain 
cannot rise higher than its source." In all attempts to acquire rights under the 
execution, the title of the defendant must be regarded as the source beyond 
which it will be impossible to proceed. 
Id. See also Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1317; Nickles, supra note 12, at 
223 n.25 (in support of a secured party's· right to recover possession from a subordinate 
secured party, Professor Nickles relies on the similar rule that ordinarily one cannot con· 
vey greater title than one possesses). 
113. See U.C.C. § 9-301 and supra note 9. 
114. Though the secured party's rights often depend on the existence of an "event of 
default," nowhere in the Code is that term defined. Usually the security agreement will 
provide the necessary definition. For examples of some typical default provisions, see B. 
CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4-4 
through 4-5 (1980). Usually the parties will agree that a levy constitutes a default. Id. 
115. See, e.g., Warren v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 693 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Clay· 
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default, however, the situation changes. The secured party then 
becomes the one with the superior right of possession.116 The 
sheriff will then take subject to this superior possessory right and 
it should make no difference whether the default precedes or fol-
lows the levy.117 
Section 9-201 also provides a basis for awarding possession to 
the secured party after default.118 It provides, in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is 
effective according to its terms between the parties, against pur-
chasers of the collateral and against creditors. "119 If the security 
agreement gives the secured party the right to possess the collat-
eral upon default, this right is presumptively enforceable against 
the lien creditor. Of course, this presumption is rebuttable in the 
event Article 9 provides otherwise. It does provide otherwise 
when it "subordinates the security interest because it has not been 
perfected . . . or defeats the security interest where certain types 
ton v. Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 {Utah 1982); Nevada Nat'I Bank v. Huff, 94 
Nev. 506, 582 P.2d 364 (1978); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Spicer, 144 Ga. App. 383, 241 
S.E.2d 273 (1977); Klingbiel v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Hitchcock, 116 Ga. App. 563, 158 S.E.2d 468 (1967). 
116. In addition to § 9-503, this right of possession will usually be granted in the 
security agreement. 
117. The lien creditor may, nevertheless, seek to circumvent the secured party's supe-
rior right to possession by resort to the equitable doctrine of marshalling. Official Com-
ment 3 to § 9-311 suggests that its application may be appropriate if, for example, "a debt 
of $100,000 is secured by inventory worth twice that amount" but only "certain units of 
the inventory are seized • • •• " Because the debtor has equity in the whole but not in any 
individual unit, the lien creditor may seek to require the secured party to first proceed 
against the items remaining with the debtor. To date, two reasons have been offered to 
justify the procedure's non-incorporation into the priority scheme of Article 9, both pre-
mised on the idea that it would defeat certain statutory rights of the secured party. First, its 
application would be violative of the secured party's right under U.C.C. § 9-501 to pursue 
remedies in any order. See B. CLARK, supra note 114, at 4-17 n.55; Labovitz, Marshalling 
Under the U.C.C.: The State of the Doctrine, 99 BANKING L.J. 440 {1982). Second, it would 
negate the right of possession granted by § 9-503. See Platte Valley Bank v. Krace, 185 
Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724 (1970). Notwithstanding these reservations, several courts have 
been receptive to the procedure and its effect on the ordering rules of Article 9. See, e.g., 
Community Bank v.Jones, 278 Or. 647, 566 P.2d 470 (1977); Shedoudy v. Beverly Surgi-
cal Supply Co., 100 Cal. App. 3d 730, 161 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1980); and In re Jack Green's 
Fashions, 597 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1979). Because marshalling cannot be used when the 
result would be inequitable there does not appear to be any reason for its outright rejec-
tion. Its appropriateness will have to depend upon the facts of each case. 
118. See Nickles, supra note 12, 228-30. 
119. U.C.C. § 9-201 (emphasis added). The term creditor, as defined in U.C.C. § 1-
201(12), includes a lien creditor. 
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of claimants are involved .... n 120 To rebut this presumption of 
effectiveness the sectioIJ. clearly requires a showing that the se-
cured party does not have priority. Since it is assumed that the 
secured party does have priority, and since section 9-201 "effec-
tively equates priority of interest . . . with priority of posses-
sion, ,,121 the secured party is entitled to vacate the levy and re-
cover possession from the sheriff. 
Recognizing the superior possessory right of the secured 
party does not, however, mean that upon repossession the lien 
creditor loses all interest in the collateral and its eventual disposi-
tion. The lien creditor clearly is protected by Part Five of Article 
9's protective provisions, 111 even though this is not explicit in the 
language of the provisions. 
C. The Lien Creditor's Right to Retain "Proceeds" Resulting 
from the Execution Sale 
If the execution sale takes place, it is quite possible that the 
secured party will assert a claim to the resultant proceeds. The 
basis for the secured party's claim will be fairly straightforward; 
the security interest continues in the proceeds pursuant to section 
9-306(2)128 and the secured party's priority position with regard to 
the original collateral carries over to the proceeds.124 This argu-
ment is quite convincing if, in fact, the secured party's interest 
continues in the proceeds. Whether it does will depend on which 
of two conflicting interpretations of section 9-306(2) one adopts. 
Professor Henson has remarked that 
[t]his provision is capable of being read to say that proceeds, which include 
collections, must be received by the debtor, or that the proceeds need not be 
120. U.C.C. § 9-201 official comment. 
121. See Nickles, supra note 12, at 229. 
122. See infra notes 171-94 and accompanying text. 
128. U.C.C. § 9-806(2) reads as follows: 
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the 
disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or 
otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections 
received by the debtor. 
124. That a secured party's priority with respect to the original collateral carries over 
to the proceeds of that collateral is, in the case of two competing secured parties, made 
explicit by U.C.C. § 9-812(6), which provides that "[f]or the purposes of subsection (5) a 
date of filing or perfection as to collateral is also a date of filing or perfection as to 
proceeds." 
1984] CREDITOR PRIORITY 175 
received by the debtor but the security interest will in any event continue in 
identifiable proceeds regardless of who receives them and it will also con-
tinue in collections received by the debtor.125 
The validity of the secured party's claim depends, therefore, upon 
what the phrase "received by the debtor" modifies in section 9-
306(2). If it modifies both the words "proceeds" and "collections" 
then the secured party has no interest in these proceeds since they 
are received by the lien creditor, not the debtor.126 
Professor Nickles argues that the drafting history of section 
9-306(2) m~kes it clear that the drafters' intent was to restrict the 
secured party's interest to only those proceeds received by the 
debtor.127 He bases his conclusion on the fact that, prior to the 
1957 Official Text, what was then section 9-306(1) provided that 
if "collateral is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of 
by the debtor the security interest continues in any identifiable 
proceeds received by the debtor."128 In this version there can be no 
doubt as to what the phrase "received by the debtor" modifies, 
and Nickles points out that since the 1957 revision was simply 
"for clarity,"lll9 it did not enlarge the secured party's entitlement 
to proceeds.180 
125. R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACilONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 6-1, at 197 (2d ed. 1979). 
126. Though lien creditors should be able to take advantage of the protective provi-
sions of Part Five of Article 9, see infra notes 171-94 and accompanying text, they are not 
"debtors." A debtor is defined as: 
the person who owes payment or other performance of the obligation secured, 
whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral, and includes the seller of 
accounts or chattel paper. Where the debtor and the owner of the collateral are 
not the same person, the term "debtor" means the owner of the collateral in 
any provision of the Article dealing with the collateral, the obligor in any provi-
sion dealing with obligation and may include both where the context so 
requires. 
u.c.c. § 9-105(1)(d). 
The courts in both Smith v. Guzman, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), 
and Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 956 (1971), 
thought that the security interest continued in the proceeds of the sheriff's sale. But 
neither court gave the issue much consideration; both ignored the patent ambiguity of § 9-
306(2). 
127. See Nickles, supra note 12, at 252. 
128. Id. at 246 and U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1952 Official Text). The present language of 
the second clause of§ 9-306(2) did not become part of the Code until 1957. See U.C.C. § 
9-306(2) (1957). 
129. See Nickles, supra note 12, at 246 (citing the explanation of the 1956 editorial 
board of the Code for the 1957 revision). 
130. See id. 
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Contrary to his assertion, however, the drafting history of 
section 9-306(2) does not dispel "any doubt that ['received by the 
debtor'] . . . modifies 'proceeds' and not just 'collections.' " 181 
The pre-1957 wording of the present second clause of section 9-
306(2) was arguably a result of the pre-1972 wording of the 
present first clause of that section.182 If the focus, during this pe-
riod, was on dispositions by the debtor, it follows that the drafters 
would focus only on proceeds received by the debtor. Why at first 
the drafters explicitly addressed only dispositions by the debtor is 
unknown. Perhaps it was mere oversight, or perhaps they thought 
that a third party disposition already was adequately handled by 
the Code.188 In any event it is unclear what the 1957 revision of 
the present second clause was meant to clarify1u in light of the 
fact that the meaning of the prior version was crystal clear. If the 
drafters believed that section 9-306 was applicable to third party 
dispositions, or that this problem was adequately handled else-
where in the Code, it could possibly be that the revision was 
meant to make clear that a secured party has an interest in pro-
ceeds, other than collections, regardless of the identity of the 
recipient. 
After considering the drafting history of section 9-306(2), the 
meaning of the second clause remains ambiguous. Although two 
disparate interpretations are possible, there are persuasive reasons 
for denying the secured party an interest in proceeds received by 
anyone other than the debtor, including the lien creditor.18 is 
131. Id. at 252. 
132. Prior to 1957, the precursor to § 9-306(2) read, in part, as follows: 
When collateral is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of by the 
debtor the security interest continues on any identifiable proceeds received by 
the debtor ..• [. T]he security interest also continues in the original collateral 
unless the debtor's action was authorized by the secured party in the security 
agreement or otherwise • • . • 
u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1957). 
In 1957, the language of§ 9-306(1), in modified form, first appeared in § 9-306(2). It 
then read: "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless 
his action was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise ••.• " 
u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1957). 
This clause was then amended in 1972 to read as it does today. See supra note 123. 
133. See infra note 207. 
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
135. Professor Henson argues that to read § 9-306(2) so as to deny to the secured 
party an interest in proceeds received by third parties would be to deny protection to the 
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Theoretically, a knowledgeable purchaser at an execution sale 
will not bid an amount in excess of the debtor's equity in the col-
lateral.188 If the lien creditor were required to turn over to the 
secured party the sale proceeds up to the amount of the secured 
debt, the creditor would get nothing unless the property sold for 
an amount greater than the total of the secured debt plus the 
costs of the levy and sale. Since prior to the levy the lien creditor 
has :i;io way of accurately gauging the amount of the secured 
debt, 187 the act of levy becomes a gamble which the creditor may 
be unwilling to take or incapable of taking. As a result, the 
debtor's equity remains shielded. Even if the creditor, prior to the 
levy, could obtain accurate information regarding the secured 
debt, the creditor's decision as to whether or not to levy should 
depend solely on the value of the debtor's ownership interest, as it 
does with regard to unencumbered property. It would seem 
anomalous if this decision were to hinge on a comparison of the 
value of the debtor's ownership interest with that of the interest 
of some third party. 
Moreover, giving the secured party an interest in sale pro-
ceeds could also have the effect of reducing the value of the 
debtor's ownership interest in the collateral, a result to be avoided 
if possible.188 Upon learning of the levy the secured party could 
choose to recover possession of the collateral and pursue options 
available under Part Five of Article 9.189 This, however, entails 
secured party when it is most needed. He worries that upon debtor's insolvency the se-
cured party would have no claim to proceeds received by a receiver or trustee. See R. HEN-
SON, supra note 125, at 197-98. His concern, however, is unfounded. Such a creditor repre-
sentative becomes, in effect, the owner of the debtor's assets. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541 
(1982). Thus, such a creditor representative easily fits within the definition of debtor for 
purposes of§ 9-306(2). See supra note 126. 
136. To bid more than the amount of the debtor's equity would expose the purchaser 
to the risk of having to pay more than the collateral is worth. This happens whenever the 
purchaser must pay off the secured debt in order to avoid losing the collateral. In fact, the 
purchaser should bid less than the debtor's equity to compensate for the riskiness of the 
purchase. It has been noted that "a title acquired at [a] sheriff's sale [is] of all titles perhaps 
one of the most doubtful." Lloyd, Executions at Common Law, 62 U. PA. L. REv. 354, 368 
(1914). 
137. Prior to the levy, the lien creditor, who is not entitled to a "Statement of Ac-
count" under U .C.C. § 9-208, must depend on the cooperation of the secuted party, which 
may not be forthcoming. 
138. Such a result is not only detrimental to the debtor, but will also work to the 
collective disadvantage of the other creditors. See generally Jackson, supra note 63. 
139. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. 
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certain risks which the secured party would undoubtedly like to 
avoid.140 One way to do this would be to let the lien creditor do 
all the dirty work. If the secured party is entitled to the sale pro-
ceeds then the lien creditor is, for all practical purposes, effectuat-
ing a disposition on behalf of the secured party which is outside, 
and thus avoids the pitfalls, of Article 9. Thus, even though an 
Article 9 disposition may maximize the sale proceeds141 the se-
cured party will often be content to allow the execution sale to go 
forward. On the other hand, if denied an interest in proceeds re-
ceived by the lien creditor, the secured party would normally have 
no choice but to recover possession of the collateral and control 
its sale.142 
Giving a secured party an interest in proceeds received by 
one other than the debtor will also make U .C.C. filings less effec-
tive in putting third-party searchers on notice that certain prop-
erty may be subject to a security interest. Whenever a secured 
party retains an interest in property not in the possession of the 
debtor named in the financing statement, the ability to discover 
that interest is substantially reduced.143 Sometimes this is justified 
as a consequence of protecting the value of the original security 
interest;144 when the interests of the secured party are balanced 
140. A secured party will certainly be aware that 
misbehavior in • • • reselling collateral can bring upon him a variety of unpleas-
ant consequences ..•• They may be classified as follows: (1) criminal liability 
under state and federal laws; (2) tort liability for improper collection behavior; 
(3) statutory liability under 9-507 for loss caused by deviation from the provi-
sions of Part Five of Article Nine; (4) statutory liability under 9-507 as a penalty 
for the improper .•• resale of consumer goods; and (5) denial of a deficiency 
judgment. 
j. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF 'IllE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
1123 (2d ed. 1980). 
141. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
142. To do otherwise may result in the loss of the collateral. There is the possibility 
that a court will find that the secured party has, by inaction, impliedly consented to the 
sale, with the result that the purchaser takes free of the security interest. See infra note 
208. Even if the security interest continues, the collateral will be in the hands of a third 
party, whose intentions regarding it are unknown. 
143. If, because of an interest in proceeds, the secured party is less likely to interfere 
with the sale, the instances of purchasers taking subject to a security interest would un-
doubtedly increase. Since the secured party is under no duty to file a new financing state-
ment naming the purchaser as debtor, see U.C.C. § 9-402(7), a third-party searcher will 
only discover the security interest if the transferee truthfully represents the collateral's 
origin. 
144. If the secured party were required to refile each time possession of the collateral 
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against those of third parties, the balance often tips in favor of the 
former. In this situation, however, the balance tips the other way. 
The secured party is already adequately protected without the ad-
ditional right of having an interest in proceeds.145 
D. The Lien Creditor's Liability for Conversion of the Collateral 
One possible post-levy option available to the secured party is 
to forego any attempt at repossession and in its stead to bring an 
action against the lien creditor for conversion of the collateral. 
Though the secured party does not own the collateral, after de-
fault he or she does have the superior right to possess the collat-
eral and control its disposition.146 This, the secured party will ar-
gue, entitles him or her to maintain an action for conversion 
against anyone who interferes with that right, including a creditor 
causing a levy .147 Although the Code recognizes this right "in an 
appropriate case," it offers no guidance on when a case is appro-
priate.148 Does a conversion occur by the mere act of levy or does 
the existence of the tort depend on post-levy events? 
One cannot say with certainty that most courts, if presented 
with the issue, would hold that the act of levy itself, without more, 
constitutes a conversion. 149 That view is not only contrary to the 
changed, burdensome monitoring costs would result in secured credit becoming another 
historical relic. 
145. The secured party has the right to recover possession of the collateral from the 
sheriff, see supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text, from the purchaser, see iefra.notes 
195-212 and accompanying text, and, in an appropriate case, from either the lien creditor 
or purchaser for conversion of the collateral, see infra notes 146-70 and accompanying text 
and notes 213-18 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. 
147. Though Professor Prosser was of the opinion that the term conversion "almost 
defies definition," w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 15, at 79 (4th ed. 1971), 
a definition is attempted in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. It defines the tort as "an 
intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with 
the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the 
full value of the chattel." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965). The gist of 
the action is defendant's interference with the plaintiff's "control" or "possessory," as op-
posed to "ownership," interest. See also id. at § 225; and W. PROSSER, supra, at 93-97. 
148. See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3. 
149. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. Though some courts may be will-
ing to adopt a "levy equals conversion" approach, the commentators are not. See Hender-
son, supra note 11, at 209-lO;Justice, supra note 35, at 441-43. For the rejection ofa per 
se approach to conversion in other contexts, see Nickles, supra note 10, at 520-36 (the 
mere act of purchasing collateral after the debtor's default is not a conversion); and Nick-
les, supra note 12, at 256-71 (the mere repossession by a junior secured party is not a 
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approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the evident 
intent of the drafters of the Code, but should be rejected on pol-
icy grounds. 
Unlike its predecessor, the Restatement (Second) explicitly 
adopts the view of Professor Prosser that "the tort of conversion 
[should be] confined to those major interferences with the chattel, 
or with the plaintiff's rights in it, which are so serious, and so im-
portant, as to justify the forced judicial sale to the defendant 
which is the distinguishing feature of the action. " 1110 This was ac-
complished by including the phrase "seriously interferes" within 
the definition of conversion1111 and by adding subsection two to 
section 222A, which contains a non-exhaustive list of those factors 
which should be considered when determining the seriousness of 
defendants' interference.1112 The notion that defendants' act alone 
is determinative of liability is clearly rejected. What must be taken 
into account is "[ n ]ot only the conduct of the defendant but also 
its consequences."1118 Under this approach, a levy which does not 
seriously interfere with the secured party's right of possession 
would not constitute a conversion. 
Another reason for rejecting the levy-equals-conversion ap-
proach is the existence of section 9-311. Since it is plausible to 
interpret that section as authorizing the levy, 1114 how can that act 
be characterized as wrongful? It follows that if the instigation of 
conversion). 
150. W. PROSSER, supra note 147, at 80-81. 
151. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965). 
152. Among the factors to be considered when gauging the seriousness of a defen-
dant's interference are: 
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control; 
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other's right of 
control; 
(c) the actor's good faith; 
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the other's right of 
control; 
(e) the harm done to the chattel; 
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other. 
Id. § 222A(2) (1965). 
153. Id. at comment d. Cases holding that there must be a serious interference before 
there can be a conversion include: Mustola v. Toddy, 253 Or. 658, 456 P.2d 1004 (1969); 
Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 828 
P.2d 726 (1958); Polley v. Shoemaker, 201 Neb. 91, 266 N.W.2d 222 (1978); Muzzy v. 
Rockingham County Trust Co., 113 N.H. 520, 809 A.2d 893 (1973); and Romano v. 
Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 540 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
154. See supra notes 76-107 and accompanying text. 
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the levy is not unlawful the tort's existence must result from sub-
sequent events. 11515 If the lien creditor refuses, after demand, to se-
cure the collateral's release1156 or otherwise seriously interferes with 
the secured party's right of possession, 1157 there is a conversion. In 
that case section 9-311 will not protect the lien creditor. That sec-
tion does not, and certainly was never intended to, sanction be-
havior of a third party which is inconsistent with his or her 
subordinate position under the Code's priority rules. The levy 
alone is not inconsistent with that position, but further acts may 
be. 
Finally, permitting the secured party to recover for conver-
sion as a result of the levy alone is tantamount to recognizing that 
party's claim to the execution sale proceeds, only worse.1158 If the 
secured party is given a prior claim to the sale proceeds, then the 
decision to levy makes sense only if it is anticipated that those pro-
ceeds will exceed the sum of the outstanding secured debt and the 
costs of sale.1159 The same is true if liability for conversion results 
from the levy, except that in this situation the downside risk to 
the creditor as a result of a miscalculation is increased. In the for-
mer case the potential out-of-pocket loss to the creditor is limited 
to the costs of sale; in the latter case the costs include also the 
amount by which the secured debt or market value of the collat-
eral, whichever is less, exceeds the amount of proceeds.160 This 
increased risk can only have the effect of further separating a 
debtor's judgment creditors from access to his or her equity in the 
collateral. Perhaps most importantly, the lien creditor's liability 
155. For similar conclusions, see Henderson, supra note 11, at 206; Citizens Bank v. 
Perrin & Sons, 253 Ark. 639, 488 S.W.2d 14 (1972). 
156. See W. PROSSER, supra note 147, at 89; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 237 
(1965). In such a case "[t]he conversion consists in the unlawful detention of the chattel, 
and not in the manner in which possession was originally acquired." Id. at comment e. 
157. If the lien creditor delays in securing the release of the collateral, there should 
be no conversion unless the delay seriously impinges upon the secured party's rights. 
"There may be trivial and unimportant detentions of chattels which are not so serious as to 
amount to a conversion. Thus a delay of five minutes in surrendering goods, even though 
it may be unreasonable under the circumstances, is normally not enough for conversion." 
Id. at comment a. 
158. For reasons which justify rejection of the secured party's claim to the sale pro-
ceeds, see supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text. 
159. Only then will anything remain for distribution to the lien creditor. 
160. For discussion of the appropriate measure of damages, see infra notes 168-70 and 
accompanying text. If recoverable damages exceed the amount of proceeds received, that 
difference must come out of the lien creditor's pocket. 
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will only deter the secured party from taking control of the collat-
eral's disposition. The temptation towards inaction is not as great 
when the secured party is given a right to the proceeds, since in 
this situation the damage claim will often exceed the amount of 
proceeds and the secured party need not be concerned with the 
possibility of a minuscule sale price.161 
Conditioning the lien creditor's liability upon the conse-
quences of the levy and not the act itself should result in a pattern 
of post-levy behavior which adequately protects the interests of all 
concerned. One would expect, as a response to the avoidable risk 
of conversion, that the lien creditor will, prior to the execution 
sale, notify the secured party of the collateral's seizure.192 
Whether the absence of notice justifies the imposition of liability 
will have to depend on the facts of each case, but there is no rea-
son why a creditor should assume a risk which can be avoided. 
With notice of the levy, the secured party will, as a practical 
matter, have no choice but to assert a superior right of possession. 
If the secured party permits the execution sale to take place, he or 
she should have neither a cause of action for conversion against 
the lien creditor168 nor a claim to the sale proceeds. 164 The only 
rights the secured party should retain in this situation are those of 
tracking down and repossessing the collateral, and "in an appro-
priate case," maintaining a conversion action against the 
purchaser .1615 
Assuming a demand for possession by the secured party, the 
lien creditor will be required, to avoid a conversion, to secure the 
collateral's release.166 Once in possession, the secured party•s con-
161. Also affecting the secured party's decision will be the likelihood of satisfying a 
judgment against the lien creditor and the length of time required to obtain that 
judgment. 
162. Notice of the levy should also result in the cessation of further advances being 
made by the secured party. This will preclude advances made more than 45 days from the 
date the lien attached from being secured. See U.C.C. § 9-301(4). Thus, there should be no 
dissipation of debtor's equity after the levy. 
163. If the secured party, with knowledge of the levy, permits the sale to occur, this 
inaction should be construed as consent since "[s]ilence and inaction may manifest consent 
where a reasonable person would speak if he objected." W. PROSSER, supra note 147, at 
102. 
164. See supra notes 123-45 and accompanying text. 
165. Even these rights will be lost if a court later determines that the sale had been 
authorized by the secured party. See infra note 208. 
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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duct must comport with the requirements of Part Five of Article 
9, which provide the debtor and lien creditor with an adequate 
measure of protection.167 
In the event that the interference with the secured party's in-
terest is serious enough to constitute a conversion, the court must 
determine the appropriate measure of damages. Since the secured 
party's interest in the collateral is potentially less than its market 
value at the time of conversion, any recovery should be limited to 
the lesser value.168 To allow recovery in excess of the secured 
party's interest simply makes no sense unless the defendant's con-
duct was egregious enough to justify what amounts to an award of 
punitive damages.169 In no other circumstances should the secured 
party receive a windfall. If, as at least one court has suggested, 170 
the excess recovery must be returned to the debtor, then he or 
she receives the .windfall in the form of realization upon equity, 
because the equity rightfully belongs to the lien creditor or execu-
tion sale purchaser. Moreover, if the conversion action is against 
the purchaser, it makes no sense to require the purchaser to 
purchase the one thing for which he or she has already paid: the 
debtor's equity. 
E. The Lien Creditor's Rights Upon the Secured Party's 
Repossession of the Collateral 
Repossession by the secured party will effectively insulate the 
debtor's equity in the collateral unless: (1) the lien creditor contin-
ues to be a lien creditor, and (2) the lien creditor comes under the 
protective umbrella of Part Five of Article 9.171 If the existence 
and/or perfection of the lien creditor's lien depends upon the 
167. For discussion regarding the lien creditor's rights after repossession by the se-
cured party, see infra notes 171-94 and accompanying text. 
168. The REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that a successful plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover "the value of the subject matter or • • • his interest in it at the time and 
place of the conversion, destruction or impairment • • . ." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 927 (1979). See also Nickl~s, supra note 10, at 536-39. 
169. An award of punitive damages may result from "conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.'' 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
170. See Cooper v. Citizens Bank, 129 Ga. App. 261, 199 S.E.2d 369 (1973). 
171. The importance of these two issues was also recognized by Henderson, supra 
note 11, at 229-30. 
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sheriff's taking possession of the collateral172 it could be argued 
that the lien is lost when that possession is lost. If this were true, 
the lien creditor would become one of many general creditors, 
without an interest in specific property of the debtor and no 
longer entitled to special recognition or treatment. The conflict 
between the lien creditor and the secured party would vanish. 
Although a lien is possessory in origin, it is not necessarily 
abandoned once the sheriff relinquishes possession. Nor does it 
follow that if the levy is abandoned as against one particular per-
son it is abandoned against all persons. When possession is deliv-
ered to the secured party, it cannot be said that there has been an 
actual and intentional abandonment. Moreover, by that act alone, 
no culpability can be attributed to the creditor .178 There is, there-
fore, no reason to question the lien's continued validity as against 
the debtor. It should be deemed vacated only as against innocent 
third parties who are somehow misled by what has become a se-
cret levy.174 There is also no difficulty in concluding that the lien 
continues intact as against the secured party who is clearly not a 
purchaser for value without notice of the lien. In an analogous 
context, courts have held that a sheriff may surrender property to 
a court-appointed receiver of the debtor without, thereby, aban-
doning the lien.175 No purpose is served by concluding, at least as 
against the debtor and secured party, that the sheriff's loss of pos-
session releases the lien. 
172. In "order of levy" states, the lien dates from, and depends upon, the sheriff's 
seizure of the property. In "order of delivery" states, though the lien arises upon delivery 
of the writ of execution to the sheriff, it remains inchoate pending an actual levy. Seizure is 
not necessary, however, and the lien creditor does not risk losing that status when the 
secured party repossesses in those states which have adopted a filing system as a means of 
creating or preserving the creditor's lien. See Ward, supra note 8, at 235-47. 
173. Professor Freeman has concluded that 
[a] levy is often spoken of as abandoned, when what is meant is that the facts 
intervening after it was made show that it was not made in good faith nor for 
the purpose of enforcing it, and must, therefore be disregarded. If the object of 
the plaintiff apparently was merely to obtain some security, or to prevent some 
other levy being made in advance of his, or to hinder or delay other creditors 
of the defendant, the levy must be adjudged fraudulent and void. 
2 A. FREEMAN, supra note 90, § 271, at 1522. 
17 4. If a third party is misled as a result of the sheriff's lack of possession "there can 
be no doubt that, as to such [third party], a levy may be deemed abandoned when, as 
against the defendant, it may be regarded as still in force." Id. at 1521. 
175. See In re Boswell, 8 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); In re Endlar, 192 F. 762 (1st 
Cir. 1911). 
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The continued existence of the lien is worth very little, how-
ever, if the creditor is not a beneficiary of Article 9's protective 
provisions. These include: the right to receive any surplus;176 the 
right to receive notice of any intended disposition;177 the right to 
object to the secured party's proposal to retain the collateral in 
satisfaction of the debt;178 the right to redeem the collateral;179 
and the right to recover from the secured party for loss caused by 
the secured party's failure to comply with Part Five.180 The prob-
lem for the lien creditor is that the only express beneficiaries of 
these provisions are the debtor and subordinate secured parties 
who have notified the secured party of their interest. Professor 
Gilmore, recognizing the lien creditor's need for protection, has 
suggested that the terms "secured parties" and "security inter-
ests," when used in these sections, "be read broadly to include the 
liens. " 181 
There is a way to arrive at this result without, at the same 
time, unnecessarily expanding the scope of Code-defined terms. 
When the lien attaches, what it attaches to is the "real" interest of 
the debtor.182 That interest is not limited to the corporeal, but 
also includes the incorporeal; the scope of the lien encompasses 
the debtor's rights under Article 9.183 The Code itself suggests 
just such a conclusion. 
Both section 9-105(1)(d)1" and section 9-1121811 recognize 
176. u.c.c. § 9-504(2). 
177. u.c.c. § 9-504(3). 
178. u.c.c. § 9-505(2). 
179. u.c.c. § 9-506. 
180. u.c.c. § 9-507. 
181. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 87, § 44.8, at 1250. 
182. See supra note 112. 
183. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. One commentator posits that the 
purpose of§ 9-311 was "to permit an involuntary transfer of those rights." Justice, supra 
note 35, at 440. 
184. The complete text of§ 9-105(1){d) is set out supra note 126. 
185. Section 9-112 provides that 
[u]nless otherwise agreed, when a secured party knows that collateral is owned 
by a person who is not the debtor, the owner of the collateral is entitled to 
receive from the secured party any surplus under Section 9-502(2) or under 
Section 9-504(1), and is not liable for the debt or for any deficiency after resale, 
and has the same right as the debtor 
(a) to receive statements under Section 9-208; 
(b) to receive notice of and to object to a secured party's proposal to 
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the indebtedness under Section 9-
505; 
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that these rights are capable of alienation. They can be trans-
ferred independently of188 or in conjunction with, a transfer of 
the collateral.187 As a consequence of these two sections, most Ar-
ticle 9 rights "tag along" with ownership of the collateral. When 
the execution sale purchaser acquires the collateral, he or she, as 
owner, 188 though not liable for the secured debt or for any defi-
ciency after resale, acquires these rights.189 If the purchase in-
cludes these incorporeal interests, it follows that the levy is upon 
and the lien attaches to those interests.190 
As a result of a levy, though legal title remains with the 
debtor, the sheriff acquires a special property in that which is lev-
ied upon, 191 which, in the case of collateral, must include the 
debtor's Article 9 rights. This special property justifies, under cer-
tain circumstances, treating the sheriff as if he or she were the 
"owner of an absolute title."19ll Such treatment is appropriate 
when to do otherwise would impair the effectiveness of the 
levy.198 This suggests that, after the secured party's repossession, 
the sheriff should be treated as owner of the collateral (so as to 
receive any surplus generated by the resale on behalf of the lien 
(c) to redeem the collateral under Section 9-506; 
(d) to obtain injunctive or other relief under Section 9-507(1); and 
(e) to recover losses caused to him under Section 9-208(2). 
186. Because of the chameleonic nature of the term "debtor" under the Code, one 
acquires many of Article 9's entitlements simply by becoming obligated for the secured 
debt. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lane, 466 F. Supp. 1326 (M.D. Fla. 1979); 
Third Nat'! Bank Sc Trust Co. v. Stagnaro, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 675 (Mass. 1962); 
Hepworth v. Orlando Bank Sc Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41 (Fla. App. 1975); T Sc W Ice 
Cream v. Carrige Barn, Inc., 107 NJ. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (1969). 
187. See § 9-112, set out supra note 185. 
188. The purchaser acquires the same title as if there had been a voluntary convey· 
ance by the debtor. See 3 A. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at § 335. 
189. The acquisition of these rights by the purchaser does not mean that the debtor 
loses these rights. The debtor continues to be an Article 9 "debtor" because his or her 
obligation for the secured debt continues. 
190. Referring to the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, Professor Bogert similarly 
opined that "[u]nder the Act the buyer's right to redeem and interest in the proceeds of 
the resale should not be regarded as personal, but ought to be treated as property rights 
capable of alienation and liable for debts." 2A G. BOGERT, UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED§ 26, 
at 36 (1924). 
191. See 2 A. FREEMAN, supra note 90, at § 268. 
192. Id. § 268, at 1500. 
193. If, for example, after levy "the property is taken from him, or if, being left by 
him in the possession of another, it is taken from such possession by any one or is con-
verted by the custodian, the officer may sustain an action of replevin, trespass or trover 
•.• . "Id. 
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creditor19') and as co-owner, with the aebtor, of the other rights 
given by Article 9. In this way, the creditor's access to the 
debtor's equity and the secured party's accountability for im-
proper conduct are assured. 
F. The Secured Party's Rights Against the Execution Sale 
Purchaser 
If the execution sale does occur, the disposition of the collat-
eral will not terminate the secured party's interest. On this point 
all commentators1911 and most courts196 agree. What is not quite so 
clear is whether this conclusion results from application of the 
U .C.C. or from a separate body of law relating to execution sales 
or, perhaps, a combination of both. 
One commentator, who has suggested that the title of the ex-
ecution sale purchaser is governed by non-Code law, was appar-
ently concerned that application of the Code could work to the 
detriment of the lien creditor.197 In particular, his concern in-
volved the title received by a purchaser who purchases property 
subject to an unperfected security interest.198 If the Code applies, 
though the lien creditor has priority over the secured party ,199 the 
purchaser will nevertheless take subject to the security interest if 
he or she has knowledge of the interest prior to the purchase.200 
This commentator feared that this result would subvert the 
Code's priority rules.201 To avoid this subversion it is necessary to 
apply non-Code law to the effect "that a purchaser at a judicial 
sale takes free of outstanding interests not enforceable against the 
lien creditor at the time his lien attached . . . . " 202 
194. See U.C.C. § 9-112, set forth supra note 185. Since repossession occurred from 
the sheriff the secured party may be unable to defend an improper payment of surplus to 
the debtor by arguing that he or she was unaware of the sheriff's interest. 
195. See Henderson, supra note 11, at 208-09; Justice, supra note 35, at 441-43. 
196. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text. 
197. See Note, U.C.C.-Secured Transactions-judicial Sales, 67 MICH. L. REv. "1421 
(1969). 
198. See id. at 1426. 
199. See U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(b). 
200. Since the purchaser will not qualify as a "[b]uyer in ordinary course of business," 
see U.C.C. § 1-201(9), his or her priority must depend upon § 9-301(1)(c). That section 
does not subordinate the security interest if, before the sale, the purchaser learns of the 
security interest or the secured party's interest is perfected. 
201. See Note, supra note 197, at 1428. 
202. Id. at 1428-29. 
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Although the commentator's attempt to effectuate the Code's 
priority rules cannot be faulted, his fears, in this instance, are un-
founded. They result from a failure to recognize that the proper 
resolution of an issue can require the simultaneous application of 
Code and non-Code law.203 Section 9-301(1)(b) is clearly determi-
native of the relative priority of the lien creditor, whereas the 
purchaser need not rely upon section 9-301(1)(c) to achieve prior-
ity over the secured party. What protects the purchaser in this 
case is the so-called "shelter" principal, which is unaffected by Ar-
ticle 9.2a. Its application allows the execution sale purchaser to 
succeed to the lien creditor's priority over the unperfected or sub-
sequently perfected security interest.205 In this way the secured 
party is prevented from circumventing the lien creditor's priority 
under section 9-30l(l)(b). 
In the case of a lien creditor without priority there is no rea-
so~ to look outside the Code to determine whether the purchaser 
will take free of the security interest. Section 9-306(2) sets forth 
the general rule that "[ e ]xcept where this Article otherwise pro-
vides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding 
sale, exchange or other disposition therof . . . . " It is important 
to note the absence of any requirement that the disposition be by 
the debtor. The section would therefore apply to an involuntary 
disposition of collateral at an execution sale.206 Also relevant is 
section 9-201 and its rebuttable presumption that a security inter-
203. This possibility is expressly recognized by § 1-103 which provides, in part, that 
"[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity 
. . . shall supplement its provisions." Professor Gilmore similarly stated that the Code "as-
sumes the continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it 
rests for support, which it displaces to the least possible extent, and without which it could 
not survive." Gilmore, supra note 98, at 286. 
204. The "shelter" principle "enters the Code via 1-103 and 2-403 and provides that 
a buyer gets as good a title as his seller had." j. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 140, § 
25-1 at 1031. Section 2-403(1) expands this notion by recognizing that a purchaser also 
"acquires all title which his transferor ••• had power to transfer .•.• "To determine the 
scope of this power often requires resort to principles of law outside the Code. See § 2-403 
comment I. 
205. For a collection of cases so holding, see Note, supra note 197, at 1427 n.35. 
206. Prior to the 1972 revision to Article 9, the focus of§ 9-306(2) was upon disposi-
tions by the debtor. For a discussion of the drafting history of§ 9-306(2), see supra notes 
127-34 and accompanying text. Arguably the deletion of any reference to debtor disposi-
tions was to make clear that § 9-306(2) was not so limited, but applied equally to execution 
sales. See Justice, supra note 35, at 441 n.49. 
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est is effective against all third parties. 207 Thus, unless the priority 
rules of Article 9 provide otherwise, the purchaser takes subject 
to the security interest. Unfortunately for the purchaser there is 
no rule providing otherwise.208 
Since the security interest will be effective against the pur-
chaser, the secured party is entitled to possession of the collateral 
upon the debtor's default.209 This right of possession is enforcea-
207. Professor Ward argues that "[i]f the purchaser does _not come within § 9-
301(1)(c) or some other code provision protecting him against the security interest, he falls 
victim to the residual presumption in favor of the effectiveness of the security agreement in 
§ 9-201." Ward, supra note 8, at 231-32 n.31. Under this view, the 1972 Amendment to§ 
9-306(2) was unnecessary. 
208. A secured party's inaction after learning of a levy may result in the forfeiture of 
rights. Regardless of the Code's priority rules, a security interest will not survive a sale if 
"the disposition was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or other-
wise." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (emphasis added). Does the secured party's acquiescence constitute 
an "otherwise" authorization? Although courts have been willing to equate inaction with 
consent, the typical case involves more than an isolated sale. Such a finding is usually the 
result of a prior course of dealing with the debtor. See, e.g., Central Cal. Equip. Co. v. Dolk 
Tractor Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 855, 144 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1978); Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Murray, 206 N.W.2d 96 (Iowa 1973); In re Cadwell Martin Meat Co., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
710 (Cal. 1970); Central Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Baker, 11 Wash. App. 17, 521 P.2d 
226 (1974); Planters Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Bowles, 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974); 
United States v. Central Livestock Ass'n, 349 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.D. 1972); Clovis Nat'l 
Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967); Milnes v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 
377 So. 2d 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Such a finding might also result when these-
cured party's inaction has caused a third party to be misled. See Locke v. Woods (In re 
Woods), 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 256 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). On the other hand, neither 
the interests of the lien creditor nor those of the purchaser justify a finding of consent 
when the execution is allowed to occur. See North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wash-
ington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978) (concept of waiver should not be uti-
lized in favor of one who has constructive notice of a lien); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Pate, 362 So. 2d 1245 (Miss. 1978) (secured party has no duty to act in connection with 
execution sale); and Powell v. Whirlpool Employees Fed. Credit Union, 42 Mich. App. 228, 
201 N.W.2d 683 (1972) (secured party has no duty to act in connection with execution 
sale). This does not mean, however, that the secured party's inaction is devoid of prejudi-
cial effect. After the purchase the secured party's lien becomes secret. As a result, some 
courts have voided the security interest. See In re Kittyhawk Television Corp., 383 F. Supp. 
691 (S.D. Ohio 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1975) (reasoning that under the facts of 
the case there was little danger of a secret lien, as the transaction amounted to little more 
than a name change); In re Vieths, Inc., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 943 (Wis. 1971). Regardless of 
its justification, the drafters of the Code made the conscious decision to allow just such a 
lien to exist. See Citizens Sav. Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 25-26 (Iowa 
1982); See also U.C.C. § 9-402(7), which provides for the continued effectiveness of the 
financing statement after the collateral is transferred "even though the secured party 
knows of or consents to the transfer." 
209. For a discussion of the secured party's possessory right upon debtor's default, see 
supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. 
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ble by self help, if it can be accomplished without a "breach of the 
peace,"210 or the secured party "may proceed by action."211 This 
is not to suggest, however, that upon repossession the purchaser 
no longer has an interest in the collateral. As owner, the pur-
chaser is entitled to any surplus and is a beneficiary of the post-
repossession provisions of Article 9. 212 
Although the purchaser has no liability for the secured 
debt,213 the secured party may, as an alternative to repossession, 
wish to assert a monetary claim against the purchaser in the form 
of an action for conversion. The issue then is whether "an appro-
priate case" exists for the imposition of such liability. 214 The act 
of purchase should not constitute an unlawful conversion unless 
the secured party can show that the purchase has somehow seri-
ously interfered with its superior right of possession.2111 Whether 
there has been a serious interference will, of course, depend on 
the facts of each case, yet certain post-purchase actions will cer-
tainly suggest such an interference. Examples of such actions are 
the purchaser's refusal to surrender the collateral to the secured 
party upon the latter's demand;216 the subsequent resale of the 
collateral to another;217 or any other act which diminishes the 
value of the collateral to the secured party. In summary, conver-
sion liability should not be based solely on the nature of the pur-
chaser's act (i.e. the purchase), but its consequences "are to be 
taken into account. " 218 
It may be questioned whether the labeling of the purchaser's 
actions as a conversion has any practical ramifications. Presuma-
bly, the purchaser at the time of his purchase only intended to pay 
for and acquire the debtor's equity. If aware of the secured 
party's interest and right of possession upon the debtor's default, 
the purchaser must have contemplated working something out 
210. u.c.c. § 9-503. 
211. Id. Regardless of the name given to the "action" in a particular jurisdiction, it 
will result in t~e seizure of the collateral by the sheriff or other officer and its delivery to 
the secured party. 
212. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. 
213. See § 9-112, set forth supra note 185. 
214. For discussion of lien creditor's liability for conversion, see supra notes 146-70 
and accompanying text. 
215. See generally id. 
216. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
217. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 235 (1965). 
218. Id. § 222A comment d (1965). 
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with the secured party after the purchase. This contemplated ac-
tion would probably require payment of the value of the collateral 
or the amount of the secured debt-whichever is less. Since this 
amount would equal the measure of damages for conversion, 219 
any judgment entered against the purchaser would simply reflect 
his or her prior intentions. 
This position ignores, among other things, that purchasers at 
an execution sale often lack firsthand access to information about 
the state of the debtor's financial affairs. Even when all relevant 
information is available, the possibility remains that the pur-
chaser's interests will be be adversely affected by post-sale events 
over which he or she has no control. 220 If the secured party can 
always veto ~he purchaser's offer to return the collateral and re-
cover for conversion, this necessarily increases the financial risk to 
the purchaser. The result is a lower purchase price, to the detri-
ment of the lien creditor. On the other hand, limiting the secured 
party's recovery to possession of the collateral if the purchaser's 
interference was insubstantial accords with the original expecta-
tions of the secured party and appears to be · the perfect 
compromise. 
CONCLUSION 
In its treatment of priorities, the Uniform Commercial Code 
often neglects to address the effects of its orderings. The objective 
of this Article has been to consider the ramifications of the Code's 
subordination of a judgment creditor's lien to that of a pre-exis-
tent security interest. After suggesting that subordination should 
not preclude access to debtor's equity,221 an attempt was made to 
set forth an approach which would permit such access while at the 
same time protect the worth of the secured party's interest. In so 
doing it was necessary to address several issues since each is likely 
to reoccur, and each, depending upon its resolution, can com-
pletely frustrate the lien creditor's efforts. 
219. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. 
220. One event would be the depreciation, either objective or subjective, of the collat-
eral subsequent to the purchase so that its value to the purchaser is perceived t() be less 
than the amount of damages recoverable by the secured party. In such a case, the lien 
creditor would certainly prefer to return the collateral rather than pay conversion 
damages. 
221. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text. 
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It is essential that the judgment creditor be allowed to cause a 
levy upon the collateral. This necessitates rejection of two dissimi-
lar notions. One is that the debtor has only an equitable interest 
which is immune from legal process. Section 9-311 should be in-
terpreted so as to preclude this conclusion. 222 The other is that 
causing a levy, without more, is a conversion. When determining 
whether there has been a conversion, either by the lien creditor 
or execution sale purchaser, the focus should be on the conse-
quence to the secured party, not on the nature of the act.223 Nor 
should the secured party have a claim to the proceeds of an execu-
tion sale.224 The secured party's interest is fully vindicated if he or 
she is given the right to recover possession either from the sher-
ifF215 before sale or from the purchaser228 after sale, as well as the 
right to recover for conversion in an "appropriate· case." This 
should encourage repossession and disposition by the secured 
party, which inures to the collective advantage of the debtor and 
his or her other creditors227 and does not have an adverse impact 
upon the lien creditor's collection efforts.228 Though subordinate 
under the Code, a lien creditor's interest nevertheless is worthy of 
protection. 
222. See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 146-70 and accompanying text and notes 213-20 and accompany-
ing text. 
224. See supra notes 123-45 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra notes 195-212 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 138-42, 158-61 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 171-94 and accompanying text. 
